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CHIEF JUSTICE WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT’S
CONCEPTION OF JUDICIAL INTEGRITY:
THE LEGAL HISTORY OF TUMEY V. OHIO
JOSHUA KASTENBERG*
ABSTRACT
In 1927, Chief Justice William Howard Taft led a unanimous Court to determine
that, at minimum, the right to an impartial and independent judiciary meant that the
judge had to lack a personal interest in the outcome of the trial. While the decision,
Tumey v. Ohio, was based on a judge’s pecuniary interest, it was also part of Taft’s
efforts to ensure that the nation’s judges, from the municipal courts to the Supreme
Court had the public’s confidence in their integrity. Tumey, therefore, is not simply a
decision on pecuniary interests. It can, and should, be applied to judicial elections,
including the financing of elections and limits on election speech, as well as a judge’s
association or relationships with the litigants.
CONTENTS
I.
II.

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 317
JUDICIAL AUTHORITY, IMPARTIALITY, AND DECORUM, ON THE EVE OF THE
“TAFT COURT” ....................................................................................... 324
A. Berger v. United States .................................................................. 326
B. Judicial Biography ........................................................................ 328
C. Taft and the Shaping of Judicial Governance................................ 337
THE “TAFT COURT” AND THE JUDICIAL CONTEMPT AUTHORITY ............ 341
IMPARTIAL JUSTICE: TUMEY V. OHIO ...................................................... 355
A. Tumey’s Background .................................................................... 356
B. Tumey v. Ohio: The Decision ...................................................... 361
C. Kinship: The Taft Family ............................................................... 369
CONCLUSION: CONTEMPORARY USE OF THE DECISION AND AN ARGUMENT
FOR INCORPORATING JUDICIAL INTENT IN THE FUTURE .......................... 373

III.
IV.

V.

I. INTRODUCTION
On March 7, 1927, Chief Justice William Howard Taft wrote his younger brother
Horace Taft, “I am going to deliver an opinion this morning in a very important alcohol
prohibition act matter in Ohio.”1 Taft went on to explain that the Supreme Court’s
decision did not address whether the so-called Volstead Act, which implemented the
Eighteenth Amendment, was constitutional, but rather it addressed how Ohio’s system
of prohibition enforcement violated due process.2 Ohio’s legislature had enacted a
*

Assistant Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law.

1 Letter from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Horace Taft,
Brother of Taft (Mar. 7, 1927) (on file in the Library of Congress).
2

U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII reads:

Section 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or
transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the
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prohibition statute as an analog to the Volstead Act. 3 Known as the “Crabbe Act,”
Ohio’s law barred the possession of “intoxicating liquor.”4 After mailing his letter to
his brother, Taft walked to the Supreme Court and assembled the Justices to announce
the decision. Reported in newspapers across the country, the decision, captioned as
Tumey v. Ohio, 5 determined that Ohio’s downward delegation of prohibition
enforcement to municipal courts failed to ensure due process. 6 One day before writing
to Horace, Taft wrote to his son Charles Phelps Taft II that the Court had unanimously
determined that the Crabbe Act was “invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment” and
then stressed that the Justices found the Ohio law repugnant to fundamental rights. 7
Tumey has become a benchmark for assessing judicial impartiality, but the legal
history of the decision, including how it was shaped, has hardly been written about.
Professor Robert Post, in an article titled “Federalism, Positive Law, and the
Emergence of the American Administrative State: Prohibition in the Taft Court Era,”
exportation thereof from the United States and all the territory subject to the jurisdiction
thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.
Section 2. The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to enforce
this article by appropriate legislation.
Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an
amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the several States, as provided in
the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States
by the Congress.
For more information on the implementation of the Eighteenth Amendment into law, see
National Prohibition Act of 1919, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305. Although the National Prohibition Act,
more commonly called the Volstead Act, implemented the Eighteenth Amendment, it further
restricted prohibition by making possession of alcohol, with limited exceptions, unlawful. For
more information on the constitutionality of the Volstead Act, see Rhode Island v. Palmer, 253
U.S. 350 (1920).
3 An Act to Prohibit the Liquor Traffic and to Provide for the Administration and
Enforcement of Such Prohibition and Repeal Certain Sections of the General Code, ch. 108,
OHIO GEN. CODE 6212-15 (1919). This provision barred the possession of “any intoxicating
liquors” within the state. Id. See, e.g., Ruppert v. Caffrey, 251 U.S. 264, 284 (1920).
4 See, e.g., Decker v. State, 150 N.E. 74, 75 (Ohio 1925); Krusoczky v. State, 140 N.E.
614, 615 (Ohio 1923). It appears through the available case law that the majority of prohibition
violations in Ohio were not, under state law, dealt with as felonies, but rather were adjudicated
in municipal courts where it was common for fines to be assessed. However, a person’s failure
to pay an adjudged fine could result in imprisonment.
5

Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).

6 See, e.g., Ohio Liquor Courts Declared Illegal; Supreme Court Rules Costs as Judges’
Compensation Violates Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1927, at 3; Highest Court Sounds
Doom of Liquor Courts in Ohio, THE CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Mar. 8, 1927, at 1, 10; Judge
Cannot Profit by Own Decisions: Chief Justice Taft Gives Opinion in Case of Ohio Mayor,
LEWISTON SUN (Maine), Mar. 8, 1927, at 1, 4; Ohio’s Dry Law Hit by Supreme Court,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Mar. 8, 1927, at 1.
7 Letter from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court to Charles Phelps
Taft II, son of William Howard Taft and Mayor, Cincinnati (Mar. 6, 1927) (on file in the Library
of Congress).
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placed Tumey as part of the Court’s authoritative—or “national”—expansion over the
United States.8 Yet unlike decisions upholding Prohibition, Tumey placed restraints
against its enforcement. Professor Post was not in error in analyzing Tumey in the
context of Prohibition or the Court’s authoritative expansion, but to exclusively do so
results in an incomplete historic analysis of the judicial intent underlying the decision.
For instance, Tumey arose during Taft’s efforts to limit congressional attempts to
govern the judiciary.9 The case was also decided at a time when Taft had been attacked
as being beholden to corporate interests and therefore overly partial to wealthy
litigants.10 Most importantly, Tumey was part of a line of cases and extrajudicial
actions that Taft used to shape judicial ethics. A legal history centering on Taft’s
conception of the duties and independence of judges, as well as constraints on judicial
power, amplifies how he led a largely conservative, yet jurisprudentially diverse,
Court to unanimously intervene in a state’s municipal court construct. While it may
be correct, as legal historian Melvin Urofsky has pointed out, that during the period
Taft sat as Chief Justice the justices limited their dissents in an effort to fend off
Congressional efforts to narrow federal court jurisdiction, the justices did dissent in
several appeals, particularly decisions involving criminal prosecutions. 11 The
unanimity underlying Tumey is also, in this light, a noteworthy element in analyzing
Taft’s intent.
Taft believed that Edward Tumey’s appeal from an Ohio conviction and sentence
of a fine provided an avenue to force upon the states a base-line uniformity of judicial
ethics that would bolster public confidence in the nation’s courts, including in its
“inferior courts.”12 He also intended that this judicially crafted “base-line” would be
8

Robert Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the American
Administrative State: Prohibition in the Taft Court Era, 48 YALE L. J. 1, 9 (2006).
9 See, e.g., Letter from James Beck, U.S. Representative, to William Howard Taft, Chief
Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Jan. 2, 1928) (on file in the Seeley G. Mudd Library at Princeton
University). In this letter, Beck responds to Taft that he will work with the Chief Justice to
defeat a measure initiated by Senator George Norris to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
It is clear from this letter that Taft encouraged Beck, a former Solicitor General of the United
States and Republican Congressman to work to defeat Norris:

I have your kind letter of the 24th and you may be sure that, when the Norris Resolution
comes up in the House, I will break my silence and have something to say about this
attempt to destroy the Federal Courts.
I do not know the present state of the resolution, but I rather imagine it has been
smothered in the Judiciary Committee. However, I will find out what the situation is
when Congress reconvenes today.
Id.
10 Letter from George Norris, U.S. Senator, Neb., to Henrik Shipstead, U.S. Senator,
Minn. (Dec. 7, 1922) (on file in the Library of Congress).
11

MELVIN UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 578-79 (2009). According to another
commentator, Taft had three priorities as Chief Justice: harmony, efficiency, and unanimity.
“More than a clear docket, Taft wanted unanimous decisions.” THE SUPREME COURT IN
CONFERENCE, 1940-1985: THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS, 73-74 (Del Dickson ed., 2001) [hereinafter THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE].
12

THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 11, at 74-75.
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expanded over time as new challenges arose. In examining Taft’s influence on the
shaping of the judiciary, particularly during his tenure as chief justice, it becomes clear
that Tumey should not be considered as simply a decision on the nexus between
pecuniary interest and the public’s right to an independent and impartial judiciary.
Rather, Tumey should be considered as a key part of an effort to create a judiciary
limited on power, respectful of legislative processes, and also to ensure a system of
impartial tribunals from local courts of limited jurisdiction to the nation’s highest
court. Implicit in Taft’s efforts was a related, if not intertwined, goal of shaping the
judiciary so that the public placed confidence in it. However, as noted further below,
Tumey was also a “family affair” which arose in the very geographic area that Taft
and his family had obtained political prominence, and this too influenced the
decision.13
The Court’s grant of certiorari to Tumey’s appeal was unique for several reasons.
Notwithstanding the fact that during Taft’s tenure the Court overturned state
convictions based on the teaching of children in the German language in World War
I, and in one instance, it overturned a state trial court conviction based on a white-mob
dominating a trial of African-American defendants, the Court had been historically
reticent to apply the Fourteenth Amendment to state criminal trial procedures.14 As a
sampling, in 1884 in Hurtado v. California,15 the Court determined that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not mandate the Fifth Amendment’s grand jury requirement in state
felony trials. In 1900, in Maxwell v. Dow,16 the Court not only reaffirmed that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not require a grand jury for a state felony prosecution to
proceed, but also decided that the Constitution did not require state felony trials to

13

See infra Section I.B.

14

See, e.g., MARK WARREN BAILEY, GUARDIANS OF THE MORAL ORDER: THE LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY OF THE SUPREME COURT, 1860-1910, at 106-12 (2004); THE WARREN COURT IN
HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 18-19 (Mark Tushnet ed., 1993); HENRY J. ABRAHAM,
THE JUDICIARY: THE SUPREME COURT IN THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS, 127-28 (Dorian M. Ring
ed., 1991). The “German language teaching” cases are Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923),
and Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923).
In Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87, 92 (1923), the Court, in a decision authored
by Justice Holmes, briefly discussed the facts asserted by counsel representing the five
African American men who had been sentenced to death in two trials, but then
determined that the Court would not take accept the facts underlying the trial, as part of
its decision. Moore v. Dempsey, Rather, the Court sent the appeal back to the United
States District Court to determine whether the state had taken “protective processes,” to
ensure the accused men had been afforded due process in both trials. Thus, while the
Court upheld the principle articulated in Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 345 (1915),
that a mob-dominated trial lacked due process, the Court in Moore did not specifically
find that the trial on appeal had violated due process. Because of the decision’s dearth
of facts and analysis, Moore might only be tangentially part of Taft’s conception of
judicial ethics. Certainly, the trial judge could have barred the white mob from
collecting near the court-room, but such an action was not discussed in Taft’s
correspondences nor that of the collections of the other justices.
15

Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 553 (1884).

16

Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 604-05 (1900).
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have twelve jurors as a minimum. 17 Eight years later in Twining v. New Jersey,18 the
Court determined that the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against compulsory selfincrimination did not preclude a state trial judge from instructing a jury that a
defendant’s decision to not testify in his own defense could be considered as evidence
of guilt.19 This decision permitted juries in state criminal trials to consider a “negative
inference” against a defendant that was unconstitutionally impermissible in federal
criminal trials. Thus, if the Court were to overturn Tumey’s conviction, and by
implication Ohio’s statutes and case law, the justices would, at a minimum, have to
determine whether the Fourteenth Amendment required judicial impartiality in all of
the nation’s inferior courts that were administered by the states, counties, and
municipalities. Unlike the appeals arising from convictions for teaching elementary
school pupils in the German language, which had no federal criminal analog, Tumey
was convicted of violating a nationwide offense that had been emplaced into the
Constitution, albeit his conviction was prosecuted as a state crime. 20
The Court and the lesser federal courts have consistently cited to Tumey since its
issuance, but the judiciary’s use of the decision appears to have buried its legal history
into a few non-descript phrases. For instance, in 2015 in Williams-Yulee v. Florida
Bar,21 Tumey is cited twice but only as a baseline in finding that a rule prohibiting a
judicial candidate from directly soliciting potential donors was not unconstitutional.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice John Roberts observed, “The concept of public
confidence in judicial integrity does not easily reduce to precise definition, nor does it
lend itself to proof by documentary record. But no one denies that it is genuine and
compelling.”22 As noted throughout this Article, Taft linked public confidence to

17

Id. Justice Rufus Peckham, who authored the majority opinion, penned into the decision:

It appears to us that the questions whether a trial in criminal cases not capital shall be
by a jury composed of eight instead of twelve jurors, and whether in case of an infamous
crime a person shall only be liable to be tried after presentment or indictment of a twelve
jurors, and whether in case of an determined by the citizens of each State for themselves,
and do not come within the clause of the amendment under consideration, so long as all
persons within the jurisdiction of the state are made liable to be proceeded against by
the same kind of procedure and to have the same kind of trial, and the equal protection
of the laws is secured to them.
Id. at 604. The Court’s reasoning in Maxwell continued into the post-Warren Court era. For
instance, in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 411 (1972), and Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S.
356, 363 (1972), the Court, in a decision authored by Justice Byron White, determined that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not require unanimous juries in state criminal trials even though
unanimous twelve member juries were required in federal criminal trials.
18 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 114 (1908). In Adamson v. California, the Court
essentially reaffirmed that while in a federal court it would be unconstitutional to permit a jury
to consider a defendant’s silence or decision not to testify as evidence of guilt, the Fourteenth
Amendment did not prohibit a state court from permitting a jury to consider such conduct.
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59 (1947).
19

Twining, 211 U.S. at 114.

20

Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 516 (1927).

21

Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S.Ct. 1656, 1659 (2015).

22

Id. at 1667.
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judicial integrity in his approach to Tumey. In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Co.,23 the
Court, in a decision authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, determined that an elected
state supreme court judge was constitutionally required to recuse himself where an
appellant had donated over $2 million to an organization which campaigned on behalf
of the judge. The majority cited to Tumey as “the early and leading case on the
subject” of judicial recusal and noted that the Court in Tumey was concerned “with
more than the traditional common-law prohibition on direct pecuniary interest. 24 It
also was concerned with a more general concept of interests that tempt adjudicators to
disregard neutrality.”25 As noted below, while Taft would have agreed that Tumey
prohibited a judge from having a direct pecuniary interest in case that he or she
presided over, he certainly did not intend for the decision to serve as a ceiling on
recusal.26 In Republican Party v. White,27 the Court, in a decision authored by Justice
Antonin Scalia, determined that Minnesota’s statutory restriction against judicial
candidates expressing their opinions on “disputed legal or political issues” prior to an
election, failed under the First Amendment’s “strict scrutiny test.”28 In doing so,
Justice Scalia and the majority implied that Tumey did not extend so far as restricting
speech to the degree that Minnesota’s statute known as the “announce clause”
prevented, even if the statute was intended to enforce the perception of judicial
impartiality.29 It is unlikely that Taft would have agreed with the majority’s limitation
of Tumey’s applicability because, as noted throughout this Article, at times, and within
limits, he disapproved of judges overtly engaging in politics.30 Taft believed that
judges who engaged in overt political activity would have to recuse themselves from
trials and appeals where they had earlier publicly articulated a view on an issue. 31
Moreover, in the plain language of Tumey, it is clear that Taft intended for state
legislatures to regulate their judicial branch to maximize public confidence in it. In
short, the judicial intention underlying Tumey has been absent from the Court’s recent
jurisprudence and should be given new life.
With the recognition that the plain language of a decision is the paramount
determination of what later decisions incorporate, a legal history of Tumey centering

23

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Co., 556 U.S. 868, 889-90 (2009).

24

Id. at 876, 878.

25

Id. at 878. For reasons noted in Section V, in particular Ohio v. Dugan, 277 U.S. 61, 63
(1928), the Court’s interpretation of Tumey in Caperton, without more, is understandable.
26

See infra Section III.B.

27

Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 768 (2002). Known as the “announce clause,”
Minnesota’s law was designed to prohibit judicial candidates from promising outcomes in
judicial decisions.
28

Id. at 772-73. The Court pointed out that the announce clause is a broader restriction than
a prohibition against a judicial candidate promising to vote on a specific manner in a future
litigation.
29

Id. at 776.

30

See infra Section I.A.

31

Id.
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on judicial intent should result in a broader use of the decision regarding judicial
disqualification.32 This Article is divided into four sections.
Section I provides a short contextual overview of Prohibition as well as the “state”
of judicial decorum and impartiality on the eve of Taft’s ascension to the Chief
Justiceship and thereby provides context for Taft’s efforts. This section also includes
a brief biography of Taft as well as the eight other justices serving on the Court at the
time of Tumey. Section I also examines one decision, Berger v. United States,33 issued
shortly before Taft’s nomination, for its impact on Tumey.
Section II provides a brief overview of Taft’s legislative efforts as well as his role
in the formation of the American Bar Association’s first ever issuance of a model set
of judicial canons. This section also analyzes three significant Taft Court decisions on
judicial authority, particularly in regards to the judiciary’s contempt power. The three
decisions, Craig v. Hecht,34 Cooke v. United States,35 and Ex Parte Grossman,36 not
only provide context to Taft’s theory of limited judicial authority, but also were part
of a continuum leading to Tumey.
Section III describes Tumey’s origins, including the backgrounds of the attorneys
involved in the decision as well as the decision’s state legal history leading to the grant
of certiorari. This section also analyzes how far Taft intended the decision to reach.
That is, it provides evidence that Taft intended Tumey to influence more than
challenges based on direct pecuniary interest.
The conclusion, in Section IV, argues that while much of the past judicial use of
Tumey is not in error—with the caveat that “overly narrow interpretation” and “not in
error” are also not synonymous—there is a possible broader application for the
decision than previously used in two areas. The first area involves challenges based
on indirect pecuniary connections to a cause, and the second area encompasses
challenges based on implied non-pecuniary interests in the outcome. Given that recent
polling indicates a loss of public confidence in legal institutions, including the
judiciary, (both the elected or appointed state judicial branches and the federal
judiciary), a broader application of Tumey to disqualification would be consistent with
Taft’s goal of maintaining judicial integrity in both its real form and in perception. 37
On this last point, there are two caveats: (1) this Article does not call for the
abolishment of judicial elections; and (2) in focusing on the application of Tumey to
recusal/disqualification cases, the focus necessarily bypasses a detailed constitutional
analysis of efforts to curb judicial pre-election campaign speech.

32 See, e.g., United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923); Maryland v. Baltimore
Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 917 (1950).
33

Berger v. United States, 225 U.S. 22 (1921).

34

Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255 (1923).

35

Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925).

36

Ex Parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925).

37 As a poll sampling see, e.g., Jeffrey N. Jones, Trust in U.S. Judicial Branch Sinks to New
Low of 53%, GALLUP POLL (Sept. 12, 2015); Billy Correher, Voters Overwhelmingly Support
Judicial Election Reforms, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (June 21, 2013).
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II. JUDICIAL AUTHORITY, IMPARTIALITY, AND DECORUM, ON THE EVE OF THE “TAFT
COURT”
Early in the nation’s history, Congress enacted a statute which prohibited federal
judges from serving on cases in which the judge had a financial interest in the
outcome.38 Toward the end of the Gilded Age, Congress began a process of
implementing limited measures to govern the federal judiciary’s qualifications to
serve on particular trials.39 For instance, in 1891, Congress prohibited appellate judges
from serving on appeals in which they had earlier served as a trial judge. 40 In 1911,
Congress prohibited a judge from serving on a trial where the judge was also a
witness.41 These laws were clearly limited to the narrow circumstances in which a
federal judge was a property holder or shareholder, and the property or corporation
was implicitly part of a trial in which the judge presided. Moreover, facially, the laws
did not apply to the states, or, for that matter, the Supreme Court.
The Eighteenth Amendment establishing Prohibition, and the Volstead Act
implementing the Amendment in federal law, are historically intertwined with the U.S.
entry into World War I.42 Likewise, both the War and Prohibition tested the federal
judiciary’s authority as well as its impartiality. The timing of these events is important.
On April 2, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson asked Congress to declare war on the
Imperial German Government.43 Two days later, Senator Morris Sheppard, a Texas
Democrat, introduced the Eighteenth Amendment’s text for consideration to the
Senate.44 Two days after the introduction of the Amendment, Congress, in following
Wilson’s request, declared war on the Imperial German Government.45 Six weeks
later, Congress authorized a national conscription program under the Selective Draft
Act and enacted a law titled as the Espionage Act. 46 The Espionage Act prohibited
38

Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 178–79. In 1821, Congress expanded this
prohibition to include a judge’s near relatives, that is, the judge’s siblings, parents, or children,
from having a financial interest in the outcome. See Act of Mar. 3, 1821, ch. 51, 3 Stat. 643.
39 Charles Gardner, Judicial Disqualification: An Analysis of Federal Law, FED. JUD. CTR.,
2010, at 5.
40

Evarts Act, ch. 23, § 3, 26 Stat. 826 (1891).

41

Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 20, 36 Stat. 1090.

42

See, e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY: FROM RECONSTRUCTION
THROUGH THE 1920S, at 296-97 (2016); Post, supra note 8, at 12; JUSTIN CROWE, BUILDING THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY: LAW COURTS AND THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 201
(2012).
43

Jennifer K. Elsea & Matthew C. Weed, Declarations of War and Authorizations for the
Use of Military Force: Historical Background and Legal Implications, CONG. RES. SERV., Apr.
18, 2014, at 76.
44 RICHARD F. HAMM, SHAPING THE EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENT: TEMPERANCE REFORM,
LEGAL CULTURE, AND THE POLITY, 1880-1920, at 240 (1995).
45

JAMES D. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS, VOL. XVIII, at 8062-65 (1908); Act of Apr. 6, 1917, ch.1, 40 Stat.1. (declaring war
on Germany); RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra. On December
7, 1917 Congress declared war on Germany’s ally, the Austro-Hungarian Empire. See Act of
Dec. 7, 1917, ch. 1, 40 Stat. 429 (declaring war on Austria-Hungary).
46

Act of Jun. 15, 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217.
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persons from interfering with the raising, training, and deployment of the nation’s
armed forces.47 At the same time, Congress authorized the Secretary of War to issue
prohibitions to civilians on the sale of alcohol or prostitution near military bases, and
violations of these regulations were punishable as crimes in federal court.48 Because
of the Secretary of War’s statutory authority to delegate rule making to military
officers, the authorization was a remarkable grant of power from Congress to permit
the Army to establish civil, rather than military, crimes and punishments without
further legislation.49 In early 1918, Congress expanded the Espionage Act with the
passage of the Sedition Act.50 Congress also investigated ties between American
breweries and distilleries and Germany.51 By 1919, over 500 people were convicted in
the federal courts for violating the Espionage Act. 52 Whether the majority of
congressmen or federal judges realized it at the time, during the crisis of war and its
aftermath during the so-called “Red Scare,” the ability to preserve impartiality in the
nation’s courts would prove difficult.53 However, one prosecution in particular was to
have a bearing on Taft’s efforts to reshape the nation’s judiciary.
47 See, e.g., United States v. Pierce, 245 F. 878, 880 (N.D.N.Y. 1917). Section 3 of the
Espionage Act read:

Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully make or convey false reports
or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military
or naval forces of the United States or to promote the success of its enemies and
whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully cause or attempt to cause
insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of
the United States, or shall willfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the
United States, to the injury of the service or of the United States, shall be punished by
a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or
both.
48

See Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, § 13, 40 Stat. 76. This law was upheld in McKinley v.
United States, 249 U.S. 397, 399 (1919).
49 See, e.g., Erwin Griswold, Government in Ignorance of the Law: A Plea for Better
Publication of Executive Legislation, 48 HARV. L. REV. 198, 202 (1934). Griswold later served
as Dean of Harvard University’s law school and then Solicitor General of the United States
during the administrations of Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon. See LISA PRUITT, ERWIN
GRISWOLD, GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 302-03 (John R. Vile ed. 2001).
50

Act of May 16, 1918, ch. 75, § 1, 40 Stat. 553 (1918).

51 Brewing and Liquor Interests and German Propaganda and Bolshevik Propaganda,
Hearing Before Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 65th Cong. (1919). Known as the “Overman
Committee,” after its chairman Senator Lee Slater Overman, a North Carolina Democrat, the
investigation expanded into investigating the existence and impact of “Bolshevik” organizations
in the United States. See JOHN THOMPSON, RUSSIA, BOLSHEVISM, AND THE VERSAILLES PEACE
239 (1967).
52 RONALD K.L. COLLINS & SAM CHALTAIN, WE MUST NOT BE AFRAID TO BE FREE: STORIES
OF FREE EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 24, (2011).
53

See, e.g., DAVID RAY PAPKE, HERETICS IN THE TEMPLE: AMERICANS WHO REJECT THE
NATIONS LEGAL FAITH 22 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1998). One example of a
federal judge involved in an extrajudicial governmental activity is Judge Julian Mack. In 1917,
Judge Mack was appointed to a three-member board that oversaw conscientious objector claims.
However, he also sat on several trials of citizens who refused to be inducted into the Army or
Navy. See, e.g., JOSHUA E. KASTENBERG & ERIC MERRIAM, IN A TIME OF TOTAL WAR: THE
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A. Berger v. United States
Victor Luitpold Berger, a former Congressman of Austrian birth, was among the
many citizens prosecuted under Espionage Act. 54 He was also a member of the
Socialist Party of America and the owner and editor of the Milwaukee Leader, a
socialist oriented newspaper.55 At the time of Berger’s indictment and trial, he was in
the process of running for an open senate seat in Wisconsin. 56 In 1918, he and four
codefendants delivered an affidavit to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois to have federal judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis recuse himself. 57 Berger
and his codefendants alleged that Landis was biased against them on the basis that
they were of German and Austrian birth and that Landis had, in other trials of persons
charged under the Espionage Act or with evading conscription, openly denigrated
Germans and pacifists.58 Landis’ son was also a pilot in the nascent Army Air Service
and actively engaged in the war against Germany. 59 The governing judicial code, as
enacted by Congress in 1912, required Landis to recuse himself from the trial on
receipt of Berger’s affidavit.60 Landis refused to do so, and Berger and his
FEDERAL JUDICIARY AND THE NATIONAL DEFENSE, 1940-1954, at 12 (2016); SECOND REPORT OF
THE PROVOST MARSHAL TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR ON THE OPERATION OF THE SELECTIVE
SERVICE SYSTEM TO DECEMBER 20, 1918, at 60 (1919). Interestingly, in 1917, Judge Mack kept
Taft informed of his role in advising Congress on drafting a federal insurance program for
soldiers and Taft supported Mack’s role in advising Congress on this program. See Letter from
Julian Mack, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, to William Howard Taft,
Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Aug. 25, 1917); and Letter from Taft, to Mack (Aug. 22,
1917) (on file in the Library of Congress).
54 WILLIAM H. THOMAS, UNSAFE FOR DEMOCRACY: WORLD WAR I AND THE U.S. JUSTICE
DEPARTMENT’S COVERT CAMPAIGN TO SUPPRESS DISSENT 113 (Paul S. Boyer ed., 2008).
55

For more information on Berger, see id.

56

Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921).

57

Id. at 27.

58

Id.

59 DAVID PIETRUSZA, JUDGE AND THE JURY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JUDGE KENESAW
MOUNTAIN LANDIS 110 (1988). Like Judge Landis, the recently deceased Justice Antonin
Scalia’s son was in the Army and served in Afghanistan. In a speech at the University of
Freiburg in Switzerland, presaging his dissent against the Court’s ruling in Boumediene v. Bush,
553 U.S. 723 (2008), he stated in response to a question:

Give me a break . . . Hamdan . . . is arguing that the federal courts should have
jurisdiction over his case, . . . if he was captured by my army on a battlefield, that is
where he belongs. I had a son on that battlefield, and they were shooting at my son, and
I'm not about to give this man who was captured in a war a full jury trial. I mean, it's
crazy.
Judge ‘Rejects Guantanamo Rights’: A US Supreme Court Justice Has Been Quoted as Saying
That Guantanamo Detainees Do Not Have the Right to be Tried in Civil Courts, BBC NEWS
(Mar. 27, 2006); see also Johnathan Turley, Our Loquacious Justices, LOS ANGELES TIMES,
Mar. 28, 2006. For reasons that should be apparent in the text, neither Taft nor Holmes would
have likely approved of Scalia’s speech.
60 See, e.g., Henry v. Speer, 201 F. 869 (5th Cir. 1913); see also Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch.
231, 36 Stat. 1087.
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codefendants were found guilty and sentenced to long terms in prison. 61 In Berger v.
United States, a decision authored by Justice Joseph McKenna, the Court determined
that Landis’ failure to recuse himself in compliance with the governing statute required
overturning the appellants’ convictions.62 Justices William Rufus Day, James Clark
McReynolds, and Mahlon Pitney dissented.63
The majority opinion is antiseptic in that it merely addresses the requirements of
the judicial code, rather than the full range of Landis’ conduct or a constitutional right
to an impartial judge. Indeed, Justice Holmes noted to his frequent correspondent
Harold Laski that “the opinion was not all [he] could wish for,” and Holmes then went
on to note that Day’s dissent was “feeble” and McReynolds’ dissent “improper in its
rhetoric.”64 Holmes concluded his letter by observing, “Landis always seems to make
himself conspicuous in ways that I lament.” 65 Holmes’ observation on Landis is
noteworthy for another reason. Berger’s trial and Landis’ wartime judicial conduct
were widely reported in the nation’s newspapers.66 The New York Tribune reported
that Landis had responded to Berger’s affidavit by calling it “a slander.”67 In 1920,
Landis proclaimed to a meeting of business executives in Chicago, “It was my great
disappointment to give Berger only 20 years in Leavenworth. I believe the law should
have enabled me to have him lined up against the wall and shot.” 68
Landis became a well-known figure in 1919 after his appointment as
Commissioner of Major League Baseball. 69 Several scholars have characterized
Landis’ dual service as baseball commissioner and federal judge as a conflict of
interest which became the impetus for the American Bar Association’s 1924 Judicial
Code.70 Taft was instrumental in creating this “first ever” judicial code, and he had

61

Berger, 255 U.S. at 27, 36.

62

Id.

63

Id.

64 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Harold
J. Laski, Political Theorist (January 3, 1921) (on file in the Library of Congress).
65

Id.

66

As a sampling of other newspapers see Berger Conviction Reversed By Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 1921, at 1; Judge Landis Overrules Dismissal Plea – Defendant’s Kin a Deserter,
N.Y. SUN, Dec. 19, 1918; Judge Landis Puts a Stop to Delays of Socialist Defendants,
WASHINGTON HERALD, Dec. 11, 1918, at 1.
67

Socialists’ Trial Set: Judge Landis Denies Berger a Change of Venue, N.Y. TRIBUNE,
Nov. 17, 1918.
68 PIETRUSZA, supra note 59, at 149; Landis Regrets He Could Not Sentence Berger to be
Shot, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1919 at 1.
69 See, e.g., NATHANIEL GROW, BASEBALL ON TRIAL: THE ORIGIN OF BASEBALL’S
ANTITRUST EXEMPTION 68 (2014); Shayna M. Sigman, The Jurisprudence of Judge Kenesaw
Mountain Landis, 15 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 277, 277-78 (2007). In the 1988 movie Eight Men
Out, actor John Anderson played the role of Landis.
70

See, e.g., GEOFFREY C HAZZARD ET AL., LAW OF LAWYERING 695 (Vol. 2, 2015); RONALD
R. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, 327 (2008); Molly McDonough, Bench Battles
Become Vocal: ABA Reviews Judges’ Code as Judicial Speech, Once Muzzled, Finds its Voice
Again, 19 A.B.A.J., 18-20 (2003); FRANK L. DEWEY, THOMAS JEFFERSON LAWYER 81 (1986);
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little regard for Landis.71 But Taft’s dislike of Landis was much deeper than Landis’
conflict of interest as baseball commissioner, and the model judicial code came about
for several reasons. In 1910, while serving as President, Taft told the Detroit Times
that Landis was “an obscure demagogue of a judge.”72 What Taft did not say to the
Detroit newspaper was also important. Landis had a personal relationship with Taft
through Taft’s older brother, Charles Phelps Taft, who simultaneously owned two
major league baseball teams, the Philadelphia Phillies and Chicago Cubs, and Landis
opposed a person owning two teams. 73 Moreover, in 1912, Taft, while in his last year
as President, removed Landis’ older brother from a postmaster position after accusing
him of neglect of duties.74 In 1921, the House of Representatives Judiciary Committee
investigated Landis’ conduct with the possibility of drafting articles of impeachment
against him.75 Congressman Benjamin Welty, an Ohio Democrat, accused Landis of
violating ethics norms for serving as commissioner of baseball and his federal
judgeship at the same time. 76 However, Landis departed the bench by the time the
House could complete its report.77
B. Judicial Biography
It has been observed that Taft had an affinity for the Judicial Branch over the
Executive Branch and an overarching desire to become Chief Justice. 78 He also had an
interest in reforming the judiciary by stemming progressive influences on it because
he believed that “progressive” changes to the law should only originate in the elected
branches of government.79 His distrust of progressive judges stemmed from the belief
Robert B. McKay, The Judiciary and Nonjudicial Activities, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 14
(1970); AM. BAR ASS'N, LANDIS RESOLUTION, 46 REP. OF THE A.B.A. 61-67 (1921).
71

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, 2011 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, 1-2 (Dec.
31, 2011). See, e.g., Conduct of Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis, Hearings Before H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 65th Cong. 4-6 (1921).
72

PIETRUSZA, supra note 59, at 97.

73

Id. at 73.

74 Taft Removes Landis, San Juan Postmaster Who Aided Roosevelt Accused of Neglect,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1912, at 6.
75

Conduct of Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis, supra note 71.

76

Id. at 5.

77 Landis Quits to Aid Legion and Baseball: Too Much Work His Excuse to Public,
CHICAGO SUNDAY TRIBUNE, Feb. 19, 1922, at 1.
78

PETER G. RENSTROM, THE TAFT COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY 72-73 (2003);
JOHN ANTHONY MALTESE, THE SELLING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 47-48 (1998).
79 RENSTROM, supra note 78, at 72-73; see also Donald F. Anderson, Building National
Consensus: The Career of William Howard Taft, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 323, 340-41 (2000); William
Howard Taft, The Attacks on the Court and Legal Procedure, 5 KY. L.J. 1, 8 (1916). Taft noted:

The third criticism of this class against judges and courts is that in the application of the
common law to new conditions, judges are out of touch with social progress and reform.
They are, it is said, rigid and reactionary and fail to shape their so-called judge-made
law to hasten the steps of society to the better things that social reformers plan. Indeed,
this is said to be true of our courts not only in the application of the common law, but
also in their construction of constitutions and the interpretation of statutes. The proper
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that such judges created law.80 Taft was born in 1857 in Cincinnati to a political family
whose roots stretched to the nation’s founding. 81 His father, Alfonso Taft, had served
as both Secretary of War and Attorney General during Ulysses Grant’s presidency and
later as both U.S. Minister to Austria-Hungary and Russia during Chester Arthur’s
presidency.82 Taft was educated at Yale University as well as the Cincinnati Law
School, the predecessor of the University of Cincinnati’s law school. 83 He then, in
order, served as: assistant prosecutor of Hamilton County, Ohio, Ohio’s internal
revenue collector, Hamilton County solicitor, superior court judge of Hamilton
County, Solicitor General of the United States, law school professor and dean of the
Cincinnati Law School, judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, Governor of the Philippine Islands, and Secretary of War.84 He was elected
President of the United States in 1908, but in 1912, he lost to Woodrow Wilson in a
four-way race against Wilson, Theodore Roosevelt, and Eugene Debs.85 In contrast to
Debs, who ran as a socialist; Roosevelt, who ran as a liberal progressive; and Wilson,
who also ran as a progressive reformer, Taft was the most conservative of the
candidates even though he too embraced aspects of progressivism.86 From 1913 until
1921, when President Warren G. Harding nominated Taft as Chief Justice, Taft taught
at Yale, remained active in the law, and generally supported Wilson’s efforts to have
the country join the League of Nations. 87
Among the myriad features involving Taft’s efforts at judicial reform, three aspects
of his judicial conduct must be taken into consideration when assessing Tumey. The
first is that by the time of Tumey’s appeal, Taft had been accused of being beholden

discharge of the difficult duties of courts requires as judges men of great ability, wide
experience, profound learning, independence and force of character, of nice
discriminating judicial quality, and with the statesmanlike perception of the distinction
between those fundamental principles of law that must be constantly maintained and
preserved in any useful system of government and of the casual and temporary rules of
human conduct that may be changed from time to time as conditions change, in the
promotion of social justice and the pursuit of community happiness.
Id. at 8.
80 See, e.g., EDWARD A. PURCELL, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE,
THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICA 21-22 (2000); EDGAR J. MCMANUS & TARA HELFMAN, LIBERTY AND UNION: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 254 (concise ed. 2014); DAVID HENRY
BURTON, TAFT, HOLMES, AND THE 1920S COURT: AN APPRAISAL 42 (1988); Stanley I. Kutler,
Chief Justice Taft and the Delusion of Judicial Exactness: A Study in Jurisprudence, 48 VA. L.
REV. 1407 (1962).
81 TIMOTHY L. HALL, SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY 275-78
(2001).
82

Id.

83

Id.; see also RENSTROM, supra note 78, at 72-73.

84

RENSTROM, supra note 78, at 72-73.

85

Id.

86

Id.

87

Anderson, supra note 79, at 344-45.
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to corporate interests.88 In 1923, the Court invalidated a federal minimum wage as it
applied to women in the District of Columbia in Adkins v. Childrens’ Hospital.89
Adkins narrowed the reach of prior decisions that upheld state legislative restrictions
on wages and working conditions. For instance, in 1908, the Court upheld state laws
on the number of hours that women could be employed in certain occupations as a
matter of the state exercising its police power to ensure the health of women. 90 Nine
years later, the Court upheld Oregon’s law capping a workday for both women and
men at ten hours.91 Taft dissented in Adkins and noted that although reducing the
number of hours an employee worked might not be wise in solving the “evils of the
sweating system,” a state legislature, or, in this instance, Congress, should at least
possess the lawful authority to do so.92
Following the Court’s issuance of Adkins, newspaper magnate William Randolph
Hearst attacked Taft as being “a sop” to “bankers and corporations,” even though Taft
had dissented from the majority.93 Hearst may have believed that Taft’s dissenting
opinion was tepid in its criticism of the majority’s opinion. The attack was based on
Taft’s relationship to Andrew Carnegie, one of the world’s wealthiest citizens who
had amassed a fortune in iron and steel production. 94 In 1919, Carnegie designated
millions of dollars to an endowment for the purpose of promoting world peace, and an
independent agency, which Taft officered, paid Taft’s salary through the
endowment.95 However, Taft did not learn of the endowment until 1919, and because
the annuity that was granted as part of the endowment was not tied to United States
Steel—the successor of Carnegie’s various corporations—he did not believe that there
was any conflict of interest.96 Taft also decided, following Hearst’s attack on him, that
the annuity had to be transferred to Yale University but that he could not resign from

88

See RENSTROM, supra note 78, at 190-92.

89

Adkins v. Children’s Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525, 562 (1923).

90

Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 416-17 (1908).

91

Bunting v. Oregon, 234 U.S. 426, 434, 438 (1917).

92

Adkins, 261 U.S. at 562 (Taft, C.J., dissenting). Taft’s language in his dissent is helpful
for placing criticisms against him in context. He wrote:
Now, I agree that it is a disputable question in the field of political economy how far a
statutory requirement of maximum hours or minimum wages may be a useful remedy
for these evils, and whether it may not make the case of the oppressed employee worse
than it was before. But it is not the function of this Court to hold congressional acts
invalid simply because they are passed to carry out economic views which the Court
believes to be unwise or unsound.
Id. However, he went on to note that he did not concur with Holmes’ more forceful dissent in
which Holmes scoffed at the majority’s use of “liberty of contract.” Id. at 563.
93

WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES,
CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890-1937, at 234 (1994).
94

AND

LABOR UNIONS

Id.

95

Id. (citing Letter from William H. Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Thomas
W. Shelton, Executive Boardmember, California State Bar Ass’n (June 23, 1923)).
96

ROSS, supra note 93, at 234-35.
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the Court because to do so would be a tacit admission of wrongdoing when no
wrongdoing had occurred.97 Taft wrote to his oldest son Robert that:
Hearst, who is attacking the Court generally, and is now attacking it
because I accepted the bequest of an annuity from Carnegie in his will. It
has given me a great deal of concern. I accepted it before I was on the
bench, and I am quite sure I would not have accepted it had I been on the
bench. I would be quite willing now to give it up or to assign it for some
good purpose, but I don’t like to do it under fire, so that I suppose I shall
have to stand the battering, which is quite nerve straining when one in
engaged in work that should command all his attention. 98
Taft was not only offended with Hearst’s accusation; he also blamed Senators Robert
La Follette and George Norris for the negative publicity and calls for Taft’s
resignation.99 There is an irony to Hearst’s attack on Taft. In 1916, Taft wrote an article
in the University of Kentucky Law Review about the state of the judiciary across the
nation.100 In regard to the lesser state courts, he penned, “If a system could be devised
that offered greater advantage to the wealthy litigant in resisting the claims of the poor
litigant, I don't know what it is.”101
A second aspect of Taft’s judicial tenure is that he remained politically active in
consulting with his Republican peers on the best means to preserve the presidency in
conservative Republican hands.102 For instance, in April 1928, he informed his son
Robert that he had advised the Republican Party’s directors of the best means to have
Herbert Hoover nominated.103 In 1923, President Coolidge had Taft work on part of
his State of the Union Address. 104 None of Taft’s political actions are surprising in
light of the fact that he was a former President, and when also considering his efforts
to achieve internal judicial reform with minimal congressional oversight, he may have
found nothing unethical or untoward in coupling his lobbying on judicial
administration efforts with political advice. As noted below, by the time of Tumey,
Taft had also regularly corresponded with senior officers of the nation’s most
politically powerful pro-Prohibition organization, the Anti-Saloon League.105 By
97

Id. at 235.

98 Letter from William H. Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Robert Taft, son of
William H. Taft (Apr. 16, 1923).
99

Letter from William H. Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Frank H. Hiscock,
Chief Judge, New York Court of Appeals (Apr. 12, 1922).
100

See Taft, supra note 79.

101

Id. at 21.

102

See, e.g., William H. Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Robert Taft, son of
William H. Taft (Apr. 27, 1924). In this letter, Taft informs his son Robert that at a gathering of
Republicans he explained, “The only hope of the Republican Party is Coolidge and I thought
Coolidge’s best course was to veto every bill that he seriously questioned.” Id.
103 Letter from William H. Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Robert Taft, son of
William H. Taft (Apr. 15, 1928).
104

See, e.g., CROWE, supra note 42, at 206.

105

See infra notes 391, 393, 396, and accompanying text.
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1908, the Anti-Saloon League had established offices in forty-three states, and the
organization had allied not only with Protestant revival movements, but also with
women’s suffrage organizations.106
Finally, Taft’s view of Prohibition and the public’s perception of his support, or
lack of support, for enforcement of the Volstead Act must be considered. Taft became
Chief Justice shortly after the Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act became
fixtures in American society, and he had never publicly supported the passage of either
measure.107 As President, he vetoed the Webb-Kenyon Act, a law requiring the federal
government to prevent the shipment of alcohol from a state without prohibition laws
to a state that prohibited alcohol.108 Taft’s reasoning behind his veto was that the act
was constitutionally dubious in that it placed too much authority over individual states
to influence the federal government, but Congress overrode his veto.109 In 1917, the
Court upheld the act’s constitutionality, and prohibitionists lampooned Taft as a drunk
for his earlier veto, leaving the impression that he did not support efforts to outlaw
liquor.110 In light of this “public impression,” Taft’s actions in Tumey are noteworthy
given that the decision was clearly not pro-liquor enforcement.
In a short time, doubts as to whether Taft supported the Eighteenth Amendment
and the Volstead Act were overshadowed by the certainty of his passion for ensuring
that the criminal laws were enforced. For instance, in Carroll v. United States, Taft
led a majority of the Court to uphold the warrantless search of vehicles suspected of
transporting alcohol in violation of the Volstead Act.111 Prior to the issuance of Carroll
on March 2, 1925, Taft had written to Horace, “The automobile is the greatest
instrument for promoting immunity of crimes of violence.” 112 The automobile had, in
fact, been instrumental to “bootleggers,” and although Justice McReynolds recognized
this fact in the first sentence of his dissent, he took Taft and the majority to task for
carving out a Fourth Amendment exception for the singular purpose of enforcing the
Volstead Act.113 Likewise, in Olmstead v. United States114 Taft led the Court to uphold

106

See J.C. Jackson, The Work of the Anti-Saloon League, 32 ANNUALS OF THE AM. ACAD.
OF POL. AND SOC. SCI. 12 (1908).
107 MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FORGOTTEN PRESIDENTS: THEIR UNTOLD CONSTITUTIONAL
LEGACY 189 (2013); DAVID E. KYVIG & HONOREE FANNONE JEFFERS, REPEALING NATIONAL
PROHIBITION 32 (2000).
108

DANIEL OKRENT, LAST CALL: THE RISE AND FALL OF PROHIBITION 58 (2010); JOHN
MILTON COOPER, PIVOTAL DECADES: THE UNITED STATES, 1900-1920, at 128 (1990).
109

COOPER, supra note 108.

110

Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 320 (1917).

111

Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).

112

Letter from William H. Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Horace D. Taft,
brother of William H. Taft (Nov. 16, 1923).
113 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 163 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). Justice McReynolds, with Justice
Sutherland joining, penned as the first sentence, “The damnable character of the ‘bootlegger's’
business should not close our eyes to the mischief which will surely follow any attempt to
destroy it by unwarranted methods.” Id.
114

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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a conviction under the Volstead Act obtained through warrantless wiretap evidence. 115
Moreover, shortly after the Court issued Tumey, he complained to his son Charles
Phelps Taft II, a county prosecutor, that Congress had failed to adequately fund the
Treasury Department to hire enough prohibition agents. 116 One month after his
complaint against Congress, Taft encouraged Charles to prosecute bootleggers to his
fullest ability in writing:
I am sorry to hear of your crime wave in Cincinnati. The immunity of these
bootleggers, due to the original conspiracy that prevents and terrorizes the
natural witnesses of the crime, is something I presume they have had in
other parts of the country. There is nothing to do but just keep at it and hire
more detectives, if you need them, and after a while you will begin to get
the thread and then you will have a collection of crimes and convictions
that will break the thing up, but it needs hard work and close
investigation.117
In 1925, he tried to place into an annual Judicial Conference report that one of the
reasons for the federal district court caseload congestion was because several states
had yet to enact or adequately enforce “little Volstead statutes.” 118 Ironically, Ohio’s
liquor prosecution laws were partly designed to ease congestion in the state and federal
courts. Finally, shortly after the Court issued Tumey, Taft wrote to the editor of the
Cincinnati Times-Star:
We could not avoid declaring the law in respect to such trials to be contrary
to due process. It is one of those instances in which an enthusiastic Attorney
General anxious to secure the proper enforcement of the prohibition law
forgot the rights of individual defendants as secured by the Constitution. 119
Taft, of course, was merely the “first among equals,” and the other eight justices
had differing jurisprudential philosophies. In 1927, the Court consisted of Justices
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Willis Van Devanter, James Clarke McReynolds, Louis
Brandeis, George Sutherland, Pierce Butler, Edward T. Sanford, and Harlan Fisk
Stone.120 With the exception of Holmes and Brandeis, and to a lesser degree Stone, the

115

Id. at 468-69.

116

Letter from William H. Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Charles P. Taft,
brother of William H. Taft (July 9, 1927).
117 Letter from William H. Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Charles P. Taft,
brother of William H. Taft (Aug. 7, 1927).
118 PETER GRAHAM FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 48 (1973).
That Ohio had passed such a “little Volstead” statute provides some irony to Tumey because the
state had, in a sense, assisted in Taft’s goal of a responsive judiciary.
119 Letter from William H. Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Moses Strauss,
Editor, Cincinnati Times-Star (Mar. 8, 1927). Charles Phelps Taft, Sr., an older brother of the
Chief Justice’s, owned the Cincinnati Times-Star. See CLARENCE E. WUNDELIN, JR, THE PAPERS
OF ROBERT TAFT, VOL I, 1889-1926, at 288 (1997).
120

BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 384 (1993).
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Court was decidedly conservative and wary of the judicial extension of federal power
over state authority.121
Theodore Roosevelt nominated Holmes to the Court in 1902. 122 Holmes had, by
the time of his appointment, become one of the leading legal scholars in the Englishspeaking world.123 Born in Boston in 1841 to a father who was a nationally known
poet, Holmes served in Union Army in the Civil War, graduated from Harvard
University’s law school in 1867, authored legal treatises, and was appointed to the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 1882.124 By the time of Tumey, Holmes was
considered a progressive justice and had dissented in several notable cases in which
he believed the federal and state governments had unconstitutionally trammeled the
free speech rights of citizens during and immediately after World War I. 125
Willis Van Devanter was born in 1859 in Indiana and, like Taft, attended the
predecessor to the University of Cincinnati’s law school. 126 At the age of thirty, he
moved to the Wyoming Territory and became involved in Republican state politics. 127
In a short time, Senator Francis E. Warren became his benefactor.128 Warren was one
of the “old guard” conservatives in Congress, and he successfully lobbied Roosevelt
to appoint Van Devanter to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit. 129
In 1910, under pressure from Warren, Taft nominated Van Devanter to the Court,
121

Id. at 383-85.

122

Id. at 384.

123

ARCHIBALD COX, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 151-53 (1987).

124 See, e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER
SELF 297 (1993); John Kang, The Soldier and the Imbecile: How Holmes’s Manliness Fated
Carrie Buck, 47 AKRON L. REV 1055, 1067-69 (2015) (describing how Holmes’s military
experiences in the Civil War contributed to his decision in Buck v. Bell).
125

Holmes authored Schenck v. United States, upholding a conviction for the exercise of
speech, which was deemed to interfere or obstruct conscription under the 1917 Selective Service
Act. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). This decision was issued on March 3, 1919.
He also authored Frohwerk v. United States, in which a conviction for the publications of
articles deemed to undermine the draft was upheld. Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204
(1919). This decision was issued on March 10, 1919. Likewise, Holmes authored Debs v. United
States, in which a conviction against labor leader Eugene Debs was upheld on the basis of Debs
allegedly inciting mutiny and public refusal to comply with the Selective Service Act. Debs v.
United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919). This decision was issued on the same day as Frohwerk. All
three of these decisions were unanimously decided. By the end of 1919, Holmes began to dissent
in similar cases, including Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1920), Schaefer v. United
States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920), and Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920). According to
some scholars, these dissents cemented Holmes’ reputation as a progressive justice who
championed free speech rights. See, e.g., THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT: HOW OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES CHANGED HIS MIND – AND CHANGED THE HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN
AMERICA 5 (2013); KERMIT HALL & JOHN J. PATRICK, THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS THAT SHAPED AMERICA 77-81 (2006).
126 WALTER F. PRATT, JR., THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EDWARD DOUGLASS WHITE: 19101921, at 21-23 (1999).
127

Id. at 22.

128

Id.; see also RENSTROM, supra note 78, at 27-28.

129

PRATT, supra note 126.

http://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol65/iss3/6

18

2017]

LEGAL HISTORY OF TUMEY V. OHIO

335

where he became one of the more conservative justices. 130 Van Devanter was noted
for his inability to write opinions in a timely manner. 131
Two of Woodrow Wilson’s judicial appointees remained on the Court at the time
of Tumey: James Clarke McReynolds and Louis Dembitz Brandeis. The two justices
were opposites in almost every conceivable manner. 132 McReynolds was born in 1862
in Kentucky and attended Vanderbilt University, where he graduated as valedictorian
in 1882.133 He later attended the University of Virginia and then served as a secretary
to Howell Edmunds Jackson, a United States senator and later Supreme Court
justice.134 Wilson nominated McReynolds as Attorney General in 1913 and then to the
Court in 1914.135 Although McReynolds vigorously prosecuted antitrust violations, he
was not a progressive and became one of the more conservative justices, as well as the
Court’s leading bigot in the twentieth century. 136
In contrast, Brandeis had been a long-time progressive, and after graduating from
Harvard University’s law school, he fought to uphold limitations on working hours, a
minimum wage, and workplace safety regulations. 137 He also distrusted the power of
large corporations over elected governments. 138 Brandeis was born in 1856 in
Kentucky to immigrant Jewish parents from the Habsburg Empire and graduated from
high school at the age of fourteen and law school at the age of eighteen. 139 His
nomination to the Court in 1916 was one of the more contentious in American history,
and much opposition to him stemmed from his Jewish faith. 140 Indeed, Taft vigorously
lobbied Republicans to oppose Brandeis.141 Like Holmes, Brandeis dissented from
130

PRATT, supra note 126; see also MELVIN UROFSKY, THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 485-86 (1994).
131 EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN
JUDGES 184-85 (1988); SCHWARTZ, supra note 120, at 206.
132

See, e.g., JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, PACKING THE COURT: THE RISE OF JUDICIAL POWER
COMING OF THE SUPREME COURT 126-27 (2009). Burns writes, “Wilson’s second
nominee for the Supreme Court could scarcely have been more different than McReynolds, or
better chosen to redeem the president’s promise to purify the judiciary. Louis D. Brandeis was
also a Southerner, born and raised in Louisville, but there the resemblance with McReynolds
ended.” Id.
AND THE

133 HALL, supra note 81, at 263; JAMES E. BOND, I DISSENT: THE LEGACY OF JUSTICE JAMES
CLARK MCREYNOLDS 1-2 (1992).
134

BOND, supra note 133, at 21.

135

Id. at 36-50.

136 Id. at 52; see also HENRY JULIAN ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A
HISTORY OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 133-35
(1999) U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON, 133-135 (REV.
ED. 1999)
137

PURCELL, supra note 80, at 116.

138

Id. at 111.

139

REBECCA SHOEMAKER, THE WHITE COURT: JUSTICE RULINGS AND LEGACY 91 (2004).

140

Id.

141

Id. at 93.
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decisions which encroached into free speech, and he continued to champion workplace
safety and wages regulations.142
In addition to Taft as Chief Justice, President Warren G. Harding appointed George
Sutherland, Pierce Butler, and Edwin Sanford to the Court. Sutherland was born in
England in 1862 and immigrated to Utah with his parents one year later. 143 He was
educated by his parents and worked in a clothing store and as an agent for Wells Fargo
before entering the Brigham Young Academy to study law. 144 In 1881, he began a
formal course of legal study at the University of Michigan’s law school, and after
passing that state’s bar examination one year later, he returned to Utah. 145 In 1900,
Utah’s voters sent him to the House of Representatives as a Republican, where he
served a single term.146 In 1904, the Utah state legislature sent him to the Senate, where
he served for two terms.147 Sutherland supported women’s suffrage, befriended Taft,
and, after leaving the Senate, became the American Bar Association’s president. 148
Taft endorsed Sutherland’s position on the Court to President Harding. 149
Pierce Butler has not fared well in the legal academy. He has been called “the least
gifted and in many ways the most doctrinaire of the [so-called] four horsemen.”150
Taft, however, lobbied Harding to nominate Butler to the Court. 151 Senator George
Norris, Taft’s chief opponent in the Senate, vocally opposed Butler’s nomination to
the Court because of his ties to “corporate interests.” 152 Norris was not alone in his
opposition. Liberals and progressives opposed Butler as well. 153 Harding’s last
142

Id. at 94.

143

Edward L. Carter & James C. Phillips, The Mormon Education of a Gentile Justice:
George Sutherland and Brigham Young Academy, 33 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 332, 332 (2008).
144

Andrew Morse, The New Respect for Justice Sutherland, 25 UTAH BAR. J. 18, 19 (2012).

145

Id. at 18.

146

HADLEY ARKES, THE RETURN OF GEORGE SUTHERLAND: RESTORING A JURISPRUDENCE OF
NATURAL RIGHTS 48 (1994).
147

Id. at 23.

148

Morse, supra note 144, at 20.

149

DOUGLAS CLOUATRE, PRESIDENTS AND THEIR JUSTICES 224 (2010).

150

HENRY JULIAN ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II 149 (5th ed. 2008). According
to Abraham, Taft had lobbied Harding to appoint former Solicitor General John W. Davis, but
Harding was unwilling to consider appointing a Democrat to the bench, even though Davis was
a conservative from West Virginia. Id. Abraham also notes that Butler had a prejudice against
Germans and socialists. Id. This would have placed Butler in the same category as Landis.
151 Id. There is an irony to Butler’s reputation. In 1964, David Danelski published the only
full-length study of Butler. See generally DAVID DANELSKI, A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE IS
APPOINTED (1964). In a review of the book, noted legal historian Loren Beth conceded that book
had “admirable objectivity,” but was a “failure to make a serious attempt to place the
appointment within its political, social, and historical framework . . . .” Loren Beth, Book
Review: A Supreme Court Justice is Appointed, 27 J. POL. 675-77 (1965).
152 Letter from George Norris, U.S. Senator, Neb., to Henrik Shipstead, U.S. Senator,
Minn. (December 7, 1922) (on file in the Library of Congress).
153

ABRAHAM, supra note 136, at 143.
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appointment is, perhaps, more historically obscure than Butler. In 1923, Harding
nominated Edward Terry Sanford to the Court, but he served for only seven years and
is best remembered for authoring the majority opinion in Gitlow v. New York,154 a
decision which upheld a New York conviction under New York’s criminal
syndicalism statute was based on speech, and Whitney v. California,155 which upheld
California’s anti-syndicalism that criminalized association with an organization whose
alleged aim was to “overthrow” the government.156
Harlan Fiske Stone was the most junior of the justices serving on the Court at the
time of Tumey, having been appointed by President Coolidge in 1925.157 Stone had
been Coolidge’s college friend at Amherst University and served as Coolidge’s
Attorney General for a year prior to his judicial nomination.158 He was born in 1875,
attended Columbia University’s law school, and later became its dean. 159 He also
worked in private practice and became a partner at Sullivan and Cromwell. 160 Coolidge
sought Stone’s help in rooting out corruption in the Justice Department.161 Over time,
Stone generally aligned with Brandeis and Holmes on appeals from criminal
convictions as well as regarding the extent of federal authority over individual
citizens.162
C. Taft and the Shaping of Judicial Governance
Taft was directly responsible for two statutory changes in the federal judiciary. In
1922, Congress passed the Judicial Conference Act, which enabled a chief justice to
assign district court judges outside of their districts on a temporary basis. 163 This part
of the law was related to Prohibition in the sense that the numbers of criminal trials
dramatically increased in some federal judicial districts—particularly those near the
Canadian border.164 The Anti-Saloon League’s leaders viewed this change with
suspicion and accused Taft of seeking to place “wet judges” in areas with a large
prohibition caseload.165 The law also created the Judicial Conference, an annual
meeting between the senior circuit judges and the Chief Justice to craft legislative

154

Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 654 (1925).

155

Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).

156

Id. at 363, 372.

157

MELVIN I. UROFSKY, DIVISION AND DISCORD: THE SUPREME COURT UNDER STONE AND
VINSON, 1941-1953, at 10 (1997); ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN F. STONE: PILLAR OF THE
LAW 5 (1953).
158

RENSTROM, supra note 78, at 80.

159

Id.

160

Id.

161 MELVIN L. UROFSKY, THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 425
(1994).
162

Id. at 426.

163

CROWE, supra note 42, at 210.

164

FISH, supra note 118, at 46-47.

165

Id. at 103.
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proposals to Congress.166 In 1925, Taft convinced Congress to enable to the Court to
gain a greater degree of control over its own docket. In what became known as the
Judiciary Act of 1925, Congress reduced the obligatory jurisdiction of the Court and
replaced it with “certiorari jurisdiction.”167 In both instances, Taft had to overcome
opposition from not only Senators Norris and Robert LaFollette, but also Senator
Thomas Walsh, a powerful member of the Judiciary Committee. 168
The Judiciary Act bears further mention than one sentence. From his time as a
judge on the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Taft had concluded that appeals
accepted by the nation’s highest court should only be constitutional in nature. 169 In
1910, in his second annual address to Congress, Taft stated, “No man ought to have,
as a matter of right, a review of his case by the Supreme Court.” 170 Four years later,
while serving as a law professor at Yale, Taft began to lobby specific congressmen to
draft a bill enabling the Court to reduce the numbers of appeals that the justices found
lacked merit for review.171 The Court was, in fact, flooded by large numbers of what
could be characterized as “garden variety” appeals that required the justices to review,
thereby creating a large gap in time between the arrival of the appeal and the issuance
of a determination.172 He led a judicial effort to achieve greater control over not only
the Court’s docket, but also that of the lower federal courts, writing to Brandeis that
the trials and appeals had become so voluminous that “justice became delayed into
injustice.”173 He asked the justices to join a committee headed by the Chief Justice and
including senior circuit justices to propose legislation to Congress. 174
Although Taft strove for judicial efficiency, any analysis of Taft’s drive to reform
the federal and state judiciaries must take into account how the public perceived
judges. The first three decades of the twentieth century witnessed an increase in
impeachment trials against federal judges. In 1903, the Senate acquitted district court
judge Charles H. Swayne after the House of Representatives had earlier determined
that he was guilty of several improprieties, including abusing his contempt
authority.175 Six years later, the House of Representatives conducted an investigation
166

CROWE, supra note 42, at 210.

167

CROWE, supra note 42, at 210.

168

FISH, supra note 118, at 103. In 1916, Taft called for a reduction in the Court’s mandatory
jurisdiction and to let the Justices vote on appeals on a certiorari basis. See Taft, supra note 79,
at 15.
169

CROWE, supra note 42, at 200.

170

UROFSKY, supra note 130, at 458.

171

FELIX FRANKFURTER AND JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A
STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 259 (2007).
172

Id.

173

Letter from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Louis Dembitz
Brandeis, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (July 24, 1921) (on file in the Library of
Congress).
174

Id.

175 39 CONG. REC. 3467 (1905); see also JAMES ELY JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE
W. FULLER, 1888-1910, at 50 (1995). Swayne had been accused of filing false claims against
the government for reimbursements regarding his travel expenses. Id.
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into Lebbeus R. Wilfley, a federal judge presiding over a consular court in China, after
a legislator accused him of anti-Catholic bias.176 In 1912, Congressman Victor Berger,
who was later convicted under the Espionage Act, asked the House of Representatives
to investigate Cornelius Hanford, a district court judge in Washington, and that same
year, the House of Representatives issued articles of impeachment against Robert
Wodrow Archbald, a judge on the U.S. Commerce Court. 177 A majority of the Senate,
but not the requisite two-thirds, voted to remove Archbald.178 The accusations against
Archbald included “procuring financial favors from litigants who were successful in
his court” as well as arbitrarily exercising his contempt power. 179 In 1913, the House
of Representative investigated Emory Speer, the district court judge for the Southern
District of Georgia.180 Speer had not engaged in any unethical conduct, but he was
irascible and publicly chastised litigants. 181 Speer was a rarity in southern politics.
Although he fought in the Confederate Army during the Civil War, when he was
elected to Congress from Georgia in 1878, he aligned with the Republican Party as an
“independent Democrat.”182 Republican President Chester Arthur nominated Speer as
a federal judge, but Taft had a particular dislike of him.183 In 1918, Taft wrote to
Senator Elihu Root, “Speer is a nuisance, a man of the most injudicial quality of mind,
a man who is a constant irritation to the Bar, and a man who uses his judicial power
to gratify his personal likes and dislikes.”184
Congressional investigations occurred well past Speer. Between 1914 and 1927,
the House of Representatives investigated, in addition to Kennesaw Landis, Daniel
Thew Wright on the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, 185 Alston Dayton on

176

Hearings Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 60th Cong. (1908).

177

S. DOC. NO. 62-1140, at 1682 (1913).

178

Conduct of Emory Speer: Hearings before a H. Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
63rd Cong. (1914).
179

Id.

180 For more information on Speer, see Timothy S. Huebner, Emory Speer and Federal
Enforcement of the Rights of African Americans, 55 AMER. J. LEGAL HIST. 34 (2015).
181

Id. One of the aspects of Speer that Taft found appalling was that Speer openly supported
Theodore Roosevelt’s “Bull Moose” presidential candidacy in 1912. Taft, the Republican
nominee campaigned against not only Woodrow Wilson, the Democrat Party nominee, but also
Socialist Party candidate Eugene Debs and Roosevelt who had been his friend and benefactor.
See id. at 61 n.69.
182

Id. at 39-40; see also Emory Speer Confirmed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1885.

183

Huebner, supra note 180, at 47; see also Letter from William Howard Taft, Kent
Professor of Law and Legal History, Yale Law School, to Elihu Root, U.S. Senator, New York
(Jan. 12, 1915) (on file in the Library of Congress).
184

Letter from William Howard Taft, Kent Professor of Law and Legal History, Yale Law
School, to Elihu Root, United States Senator, New York (Jan. 12, 1915) (on file in the Library
of Congress). Taft also acknowledged that Speer was “a man of ability” but added “he has done
things on the bench that are most improper.” Id.
185 CLARENCE CANNON, CANNON’S PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
UNITED STATES 553 (1921).
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the Northern District of West Virginia, 186 William E. Baker on the Northern District
of West Virginia,187 George English in the Eastern District of Illinois, and Frank
Cooper on the Northern District of New York.188 Thus, by the time of Tumey, public
confidence in the federal judiciary had been encumbered by number of well-publicized
scandals.189
In light of these investigations, it is unsurprising that late nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century politics included angry attacks on the fairness of the nation’s courts.
Senator George Norris of Nebraska articulated the beliefs of many Americans in 1912
when he argued that the United States possessed two systems of courts, “one for the
wealthy and one for the poor.”190 That year, Norris led the House of Representatives
in the prosecution of Archbald.191 Norris’ criticism of the federal judiciary angered
Taft, and throughout his presidency and judicial tenure, Taft expressed his dislike of
Norris, but he understood that there existed a potential for due process weaknesses in
the nation’s courts at all levels. For instance, in 1914, Taft warned the American Bar
Association:
The agitation with reference to the courts, the general attacks upon them,
the grotesque remedies proposed by the recall of judges and recall of
judicial decisions, and the resort of demagogues to the unpopularity of the
courts as a means for promoting their own political fortunes, all impose on
us as members of the bar and upon judges of the courts and legislatures, the
duty to remove . . . grounds for just criticism of our judicial system. 192
One means by which Taft sought to counter criticism in the judiciary was to create
a uniform code of ethics for judges. A code of ethics, in hindsight, was overdue. In
1908, the American Bar Association published its first canons of professional ethics

186 See Hearings Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. Designated to Investigate
Charges Against Judge Alston Dayton Serial 28, 63rd Cong. (1915). Dayton had served in
Congress as a West Virginia representative from 1895-1906. Theodore Roosevelt appointed
him to the bench in March, 1905. Dayton had represented the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad
while serving in Congress and one of that corporation’s senior officials had threatened John
J. Jackson, an elderly federal judge with impeachment proceedings through chosen
congressmen if he did not retire. Not surprisingly, the House of Representatives impeachment
inquiry found that Dayton had participated in this scheme. See id. at 954.
187 See Hearings Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. Designated to Investigate
Charges against Judge William Baker, 68th Cong. (1924).
188

See H.R. DOC. NO. 68-145 (1926).

189 For publicity on the impeachment process, see Connected with Probe of Hanford,
SEATTLE STAR, Feb. 15, 1913; Hanford Resigns: No Impeachment by Agreement with
Committee Federal Judge Withdraws Under Fire, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1912; House Committee
Says Impeach Judge Swayne, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1904.
190

Charges Against Hon. Frank Cooper, U.S. Dist. Judge for the Northern. Dist. of N.Y.:
Hearings Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 69th Cong. (1927).
191 GEORGE W. NORRIS, FIGHTING LIBERAL: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY
NORRIS 122 (1945).
192

OF

GEORGE W.

FISH, supra note 118, at 17.
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for all attorneys.193 It took sixteen years for the Association to issue its Cannons of
Judicial Ethics after a two-year process in which Taft served as the chairman of the
committee authoring the cannons.194 Taft recognized that the states would not be
bound by a national ethics code, but in the hopes of national acceptance, he appointed
Robert von Moschzisker, a justice on Pennsylvania’s supreme court, and Leslie
Cornish, the chief justice of Maine’s supreme court, to the committee.195 The thirtysix individual cannons that the bar association issued were a non-binding guidepost to
govern the conduct of federal and state judges, but there are clear indicators for Taft’s
expectations of judicial impartiality which exceeded the narrow issues before the
Court in Tumey.
Although Taft wanted to promote judicial integrity and public confidence in the
judiciary, he did not abandon the idea of a jurisprudential test for judicial
appointments. In 1922, Taft wrote to Elihu Root that he intended to meet with
President Harding to convince him to appoint Henry Stimson to the Supreme Court.196
Taft went on to claim that Woodrow Wilson had appointed Brandeis and Clarke to
“reduce the importance of the Constitution and advance a progressive agenda.” He
also urged, however, that “reactionary men” like McReynolds were an equal danger
to individual rights and concluded, “We need men who are liberal but who believe that
the corner stone of our civilization is in the proper maintenance of the guarantees of
the Fourteenth Amendment and Fifth Amendment.” 197 In 1926, Taft wrote to his
brother Horace, “The truth is that McReynolds is quite unprincipled in his method of
stating cases. He does not state them truthfully.” 198
III. THE “TAFT COURT” AND THE JUDICIAL CONTEMPT AUTHORITY
The judicial authority to find a person guilty of contempt, including the power to
sentence an offender to a fine and imprisonment, is not expressly stated in the
Constitution’s text. Moreover, the judiciary’s contempt authority enables some of the
very ends that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments prohibit the Executive Branch from

193

Editorial, Judicial Ethics, 50 A.B.A. J. 840 (1964).

194

Andrew J. Lievense & Avern Cohn, The Federal Judiciary and the ABA Model Code:
The Parting of the Ways, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 273 (2007); see also William H. Taft, Final Rep. and
Proposed Canons of Judicial Ethics, 9 A.B.A. J. 449 (1923).
195 Letter from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Charles
Burlingham (Dec. 5, 1922) (on file in the Library of Congress). Taft, however, was not
enamored with Judge Moschziker and on learning that a senator had asked President Harding
to consider Moschzisker for a Supreme Court nomination, he wrote to Burlingham, “I don’t
think that his reputation as a lawyer and a judge in Pennsylvania is so high as to lead the
President to select him. His background is political rather than professional and judicial.” Id.
196 Letter from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Elihu Root,
President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Dec. 21, 1922) (on file in the Library
of Congress). In this letter Taft also disparaged future justice, Felix Frankfurter. Taft wrote, “I
never liked Frankfurter, and have continued to dislike him the more I have known him. Indeed
the only thing I know against Stimson is his good opinion of Frankfurter.” Id.
197

Id.

198

Letter from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Horace D. Taft,
brother of William Howard Taft (Nov. 4, 1926) (on file in the Library of Congress).
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accomplishing—namely, the loss of liberty or property without a trial by jury. 199 The
judicial power to adjudge a witness, juror, spectator, or attorney of contempt is
significant, among myriad reasons, because certain contempt convictions are
tantamount to a finding of criminal guilt. 200 A judicial finding of criminal contempt,
coupled with a punitive sentence, is designed to “preserve the power and vindicate the
authority of the courts.”201 A civil contempt, in opposite, is designed to protect the
legal rights of litigants.202 There are safeguards, including the right of appellate review,
to protect individuals from being adjudged guilty of either type of contempt. 203
Additionally, in criminal contempt hearings, a person is presumed to be innocent, and
guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. 204 As an aside, civil contempt
hearings were historically structured similar to criminal contempt hearings but appear
to have caused less concern to the Court, as there were few, if any, grants of appellate
review against a civil contempt finding up through Taft’s tenure. Given the Court’s
grant of review to these appeals from contempt findings, it is clear that Taft was
concerned with the contempt powers of judges, and he was not satisfied with how the
Court and Congress had historically shaped this power. A brief history of the Court
and contempt decisions is important to provide context to Taft’s efforts to curb the
contempt authority.
In 1789, Congress conferred to the Judicial Branch the authority to find persons in
contempt, including the power to sentence a person to a fine or imprisonment. 205
Although the Constitution guarantees the right to trial by jury in criminal matters, from
the beginning of the nation, this right was not thought to extend to contempt
proceedings.206 In 1821, in Anderson v. Dunn, the Court determined that while the
199

See, e.g., Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 302 (1888); Ex parte Cuddy, 131 U.S. 280, 28384 (1889).
200 Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911). Bucks Stove & Range,
labor leader Samuel Gompers, and the American Federation of Labor ignored a judicial
injunction to cease publishing documents that encouraged readers to boycott a corporation. The
Court, in a decision authored by Justice Lamar, determined that a civil contempt arises when
the judge issues an order for a party to accomplish and act and the imprisonment which results
from the failure or refusal to conform with the act, is to convince the party to conform or remain
in prison. Id. at 442. Put another way, Lamar penned into the decision, “If imprisoned . . . he
carries the keys of his prison in his own pocket. He can end the sentence and discharge himself
at any moment by doing what he had previously refused to do.” Id.
201

Id. at 441.

202 Eilenbecker v. Dist. Court, 134 U.S. 31, 36 (1890). However, in 1914, Congress enacted
the Clayton Act which permitted jury trials in certain contempt proceedings involving picketing
and boycotting activities by unions. See, e.g., Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chi., St. Paul,
& Omaha Railway Co., 266 U.S. 42, 62-63 (1928); Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324,
328 (1904); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 594 (1895).
203

Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95 (1924).

204

Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911).

205

Establishment of the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).

206

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment,
shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been
committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places
as the Congress may by Law have directed.”); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal
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Constitution does not specifically vest Congress with the authority to punish for
contempt, the authority to do so was readily apparent by implication. 207 Dunn arose
from a challenge to the House of Representatives finding a citizen in contempt. 208
Important to the decision, however, was that the Court observed that, although the
issue on appeal had to do with the Legislative Branch’s contempt power, the federal
courts were statutorily vested with the authority to find persons in contempt. 209
Moreover, the justices maintained that even if the statute did not exist, the power
would remain.210 One can speculate that the justices involved in architecting this
decision placed language regarding judicial contempt power to remind the political
branches of government that such power was inherent in an independent judiciary.
From 1789 through John Quincy Adams’ presidency in 1825, it appeared that the
federal judiciary’s contempt authority had few defined limits. In 1826, the House of
Representatives undertook impeachment hearings against Judge James Peck, a U.S.
District Court Judge from Missouri. 211 Peck earlier had adjudged an attorney named
Luke E. Lawless guilty of contempt after Lawless published a newspaper article
critical of one of Peck’s decisions regarding an antiquated Spanish land-claim.212 Peck
sentenced Lawless to one day in prison and an eighteen-month suspension from the
practice of law.213 At the time of Lawless’ article, Peck had already issued a ruling,
and neither party had undertaken an appeal.214 Lawless argued to Peck that because
the district court no longer had jurisdiction over the contested land-claim issue, Peck
no longer had jurisdiction to hold a person in contempt who criticized the decision.215
It took until March 23, 1830 for the House of Representatives to recommend that the
Senate find Peck guilty of “high crimes or misdemeanors.” 216 The Senate ultimately

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury
of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”).
207

Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 225 (1821).

208

Id. at 224-25.

209

Id. at 227.

210

Id.

211 ARTHUR J. STANSBURY, REPORT ON THE TRIAL OF JUDGE JAMES H. PECK, JUDGE OF THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MISSOURI, BEFORE THE SENATE OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AN IMPEACHMENT PREFERRED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AGAINST
HIM FOR HIGH MISDEMEANORS IN OFFICE 7 (1833).
212

Id. at 7.

213

Id.

214

Id. at 1.

215

Id. at 2, 4.

216

Id. at 6.
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acquitted Peck by a vote of twenty-one to twenty.217 On the other hand, Peck’s
overreach in his authority resulted in the Judicial Act of 1831. 218
In response to Peck’s action, Congress limited the contempt authority of federal
judges to punish misbehavior in “the presence of the federal courts or so near thereto
as to obstruct the administration of justice.” 219 The 1831 Act also enabled a judicial
finding of contempt against a person who threatened or attempted to influence an
officer of the court, juror, or witness. 220 In 1873, the Court in Ex Parte Robison221
upheld the 1831 Act as it applied to the circuit courts, but the decision left open the
question as to whether Congress possessed the authority to constrain the Court’s
contempt authority.222 Robinson arose from a U.S. District Court’s disbarment of an
attorney during a contempt hearing.223 The federal judge had ordered a witness to be
present for a grand jury, but the witness remained absent. 224 J.S. Robinson, an attorney
named in the decision, had permitted the witness to remain in his office to avoid the
judicial summons.225 The federal judge found Robinson guilty of criminal contempt
and disbarred him.226 After granting a writ of mandamus, the Court, in a decision
authored by Justice Stephen A. Field, unanimously determined that although the
federal courts had the authority to both punish for contempt and to disbar an attorney
by “striking the petitioner’s name from the roll of attorneys,” disbarment proceedings
required a greater quantum of due process than a summary contempt proceeding. 227
That is, a disbarment hearing required notice and the opportunity to mount a
defense.228 Thus, unlike a contempt hearing which could be held immediately
following the alleged contempt, a disbarment hearing could only occur after the
attorney had been given a reasonable time to assemble a defense. In 1890, in
Eilenbecker v. District Court of Plymouth County, the Court, in a decision authored
by Justice Samuel Freeman Miller, determined that the Fourteenth Amendment did
not require a jury trial for a criminal contempt proceeding that resulted in a finding of
guilt and an imprisonment for three months. 229
217

Id. at 474.

218

Walter Nelles & Carol W. King, Contempt by Publication in the United States, 28
COLUM. L. REV. 401, 426-30 (1928).
219 Proceedings in the Senate of the United States in the Matter of the Impeachment of
Charles Swayne: Judge of the Dist. Court of the United States in and for the Northern Dist. of
Florida, 58th Cong., 757 (1905).
220

Id.

221

Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505 (1873).

222

Id. at 510-11.

223

Id. at 511.

224

Id. at 506.

225

Id. at 507.

226

Id. at 508.

227

Id. at 512-13.

228

Id.

229

Eilenbecker v. Dist. Ct. of Plymouth Cty., 134 U.S. 31, 32, 38 (1890).
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In 1888, the Court issued Ex Parte Terry,230 a decision which originated in a
habeas writ. On September 3, 1888, a woman named Sarah Althea Terry engaged in
disorderly conduct in the United States District Court for California.231 In response,
the presiding judge ordered the marshal to restrain Ms. Terry, who in turn assaulted
the marshal.232 Ms. Terry’s husband, an attorney named David Terry, also assaulted
the marshal.233 The presiding judge then found David Terry guilty of contempt and
sentenced him to six months confinement.234 Problematic to the issue was that Justice
Stephen Field was the presiding judge, albeit acting in his capacity as a circuit judge
rather than as a justice of the Court.235 In his circuit decision, Field noted that Terry
had brought a knife into the courtroom in violation of the law as well. 236 Also
problematic to the decision was the fact that Terry had been the chief justice of the
California Supreme Court prior to Field serving on that court, and the two men had
been long-time antagonists.237
Justice John Harlan authored the majority opinion in which he recognized the
inherent authority of the federal circuit courts to punish contempts.238 Harlan next
applied a jurisdictional test to determine whether the Court could issue the writ.239
Essentially, Harlan framed the issue as to whether the circuit judge had the authority
to order Terry’s imprisonment and not whether the term of six months was
reasonable.240 Terry argued that the contempt order was made in his absence, that the
court never provided him notice, and that he was not given the opportunity to defend
himself.241 Field had issued the contempt order after Terry was arrested but before he
was brought back into the courtroom. 242 However, in this instance, the Court denied
the habeas writ on the basis that in issuing the contempt determination and sentence,
“the judicial eye witnessed the act, and the judicial mind comprehended all the
circumstances of aggravation, provocation, or mitigation; and, the fact being thus

230

In re Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888).

231

Id. at 298.

232

Id.

233

Id.

234

Id..

235

In re Terry, 36 F. 419, 420 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1888).

236

Id. at 419.

237

David Schultz, Field, Stephen 1816-1899, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SUPREME COURT
S. Tanenhaus ed., 2008). Ultimately Terry attempted to
assassinate Field, but was killed by Field’s protecting United States Marshal before
accomplishing the act. See In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 5 (1890).
OF THE UNITED STATES 207, 208 (David

238

In re Terry, 128 U.S. at 302.

239

Id. at 306.

240

Id.

241

Id. at 306.

242

Id. at 311.
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judicially established, it only remained for the judicial arm to inflict proper
punishment.”243
In 1906, in United States v. Shipp,244 the Court, in a decision authored by Justice
Holmes, unanimously held that it not only possessed the authority to determine the
extent of its own jurisdiction, it also determined that it possessed jurisdiction to hold
individuals in contempt. In February 1906, a Tennessee state criminal trial found
“Johnson, a colored man,” guilty of “rape upon a white woman” and sentenced him to
death.245 Johnson’s attorneys appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit for a writ of habeas corpus.246 Although the Court of Appeals denied a
writ, Justice Harlan ordered the state to “stay” Johnson’s execution until the Court
could determine the merits of the habeas appeal.247 Shortly after Harlan’s order, a
sheriff colluded with white citizens to enable a mob to murder Johnson.248 In response,
the justices unanimously agreed to hold a contempt trial against the sheriff, the jailer,
and several other officials including the state trial judge. 249 These men appealed
against the Court’s assertion of its contempt jurisdiction. 250 The Court resoundingly
determined that it possessed jurisdiction to hold persons in contempt regarding any
issue that it possessed jurisdiction over, and, because the Court determined its own
jurisdiction, the acts or omissions of the persons responsible for Johnson’s murder
could be found contemptuous. 251 When read to its logical extent, one could find that
the Court implied that it possessed almost unlimited contempt authority.
Contempt appeals continued when Taft became Chief Justice. In 1923, the Court
determined in Craig v. Hecht that a single appellate judge could not unilaterally
reverse a district court judge’s finding of contempt. 252 In October 1919, Charles Levy
Craig, New York City’s comptroller, published an open letter to the city’s public
service commissioner disparaging United States District Court Judge Julius Mayer
during a trial in which Craig was a party. 253 For a two-year period, Mayer afforded
Craig an opportunity to retract his letter, but Craig refused to do so, and Mayer ordered
the United States Marshal, William C. Hecht, to arrest Craig for the purpose of holding

243

Id. at 312.

244

United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 573 (1906).

245

Id. at 571.

246 Id. Johnson credibly alleged that a mob had intimidated his attorneys and that AfricanAmericans had been excluded from service on the jury. Id. For the later decision in this case,
see United States v. Shipp, 214 U.S. 386 (1909).
247

Shipp, 203 U.S. at 571.

248

Id.

249

Id.

250

Id. at 572-73.

251

Id. at 574-75.

252

Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255, 279 (1923). In theory, this decision left open the possibility
that a single appellate judge could “stay” an imprisonment for contempt until the full court of
appeals heard and decided the appeal.
253

Id. at 268.
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a contempt trial.254 Ultimately, Mayer sentenced Craig to sixty days in jail and a fine,
but Martin Manton a judge on the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a
writ of habeas ordering Craig’s release.255 The Second Circuit reversed Manton and
determined that a circuit court judge could not, while acting singly, overturn a
contempt decision by a grant of habeas on the basis of a writ of error.256 When Craig’s
appeal came to the Court, Justice McReynolds, rather than Taft, authored the majority
decision in which the justices determined that a circuit court judge serving in a singular
capacity did not possess either the statutory or inherently constitutional authority to
issue a writ of habeas over a person held in confinement as a result of contempt
decision.257 The one exception to this rule would occur when the originating district
court did not possess jurisdiction over the person held in contempt. 258 Because Mayer
possessed contempt jurisdiction over Craig, the Court concluded that Manton had
exceeded his authority in granting habeas.259 Holmes, with Brandeis joining, dissented
from the decision for two reasons. First, Holmes argued that Manton was within his
authority to grant Craig habeas because Craig had been deprived of his liberty. 260
Second, and equally importantly, Holmes considered that the First Amendment’s
guarantee of freedom of speech served as one measure to show that it was Mayer who
exceeded his authority.261
Taft authored a concurrence for the purpose of reiterating that parties to a former
litigation as well as their counsel possessed a limited right to criticize a judge without
the fear of a contempt finding. 262 Under this “doctrine,” while litigation was ongoing,
a party could comment on the proceedings as long as the statements were not of a
nature to undermine the fairness of the trial. Taft stressed that once a case had been
fully adjudicated, the parties to the case were free to publicly criticize the judge. 263
254

Id. at 268-69.

255

Id. at 268-70.

256

Id. at 271.

257

Id. at 274-76.

258

Id. at 277.

259

Id. at 271.

260

Id. at 280-81 (Holmes, J., dissenting).

261

Id. at 281-82. Holmes penned, “A man cannot be summarily laid by the heels because
his words may make public feeling more unfavorable in case the judge should be asked to act
at some later date, any more than he can for exciting public feeling against a judge for what he
already has done.” Id. Arguably, Holmes’ dissent can be considered as part of his free speech
jurisprudence. While there is no letter or notation contained in his collections on this point, had
his dissent been the majority, it would have narrowed. Patterson v Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 463
(1907). This opinion, authored by Holmes, upheld the conviction of a newspaper editor who
criticized the Colorado Supreme Court. Id.
262

Hecht, 236 U.S. at 278 (Taft, C.J., concurring).

263

Id. Taft penned:

It is of primary importance that the right freely to comment on and criticize the action,
opinions and judgments of courts and judges should be preserved inviolate; but it is also
essential that courts and judges should not be impeded in the conduct of judicial
business by publications having the direct tendency and effect of obstructing the
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Taft was silent on a generalized right to criticize a judge prior to any known litigation,
such as in the case of judicial appointments and elections, in all likelihood because
such questions were not at issue. Taft also used his concurrence to criticize Craig and
his attorneys for convincing Manton to rely on an outdated statute to exceed his
judicial authority in overturning Craig’s conviction.264 Like Victor Berger’s appeals
against Landis, the New York Times reported on Craig’s and Mayer’s conduct.265
According to Alpheus Mason, one of Taft’s early biographers, Taft later lobbied
President Calvin Coolidge to pardon Craig.266 On the other hand, Taft did not hold
Craig in high esteem. In 1928, Taft wrote to his son Robert Taft, “Craig is the man
who got into contempt of the court in New York, and we had to sustain the
commitment. He is a most cantankerous fellow.”267
enforcement of their orders and judgments, or of impairing the justice and impartiality
of verdicts.
If the publication criticizes the judge or court after the matter with which the criticism
has to do has been finally adjudicated and the proceedings are ended so that the carrying
of the court's judgment cannot be thereby obstructed, the publication is not contempt
and cannot be summarily punished by the court however false, malicious or unjust it
may be. The remedy of the judge as an individual is by action or prosecution for libel.
If, however, the publication is intended and calculated to obstruct and embarrass the
court in a pending proceeding in the matter of the rendition of an impartial verdict, or
in the carrying out of its orders and judgment, the court may, and it is its duty to protect
the administration of justice by punishment of the offender for contempt.
Id. Taft’s reasoning was not unique. In 1887 the Indiana Supreme Court held in Cheadle v. State
that while a citizen was free to criticize a judge after a trial had ended, speech that was calculated
to, or had the potential to affect the outcome of the trial could be the basis for a contempt
conviction. Cheadle v. State, 11 N.E. 426, 431 (1887). In 1890, the California Supreme Court
expanded this doctrine to include newspaper coverage of a trial. See, e.g., Ex parte Barry, 85
Cal. 603, 608 (1890). Barry appears to have been significantly narrowed, if not eviscerated by
the Court in Pennekamp v. State of Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 349 (1946).
264

Hecht, 236 U.S. at 279. Taft instructively wrote:

Instead of pursuing this plain remedy for injustice that may have been done by the trial
judge and securing by an appellate court a review of this very serious question on the
merits, they sought by applying to a single judge of only coordinate authority for a writ
of habeas corpus to release the petitioner on the ground that the trial judge was without
jurisdiction to make the decision he did. This raised the sole issue whether the trial judge
had authority to decide the question, not whether he had rightly decided it.
Id.
265

Craig Loses Appeal From Jail Sentence: Higher Court Holds Judge Manton Had No
Power to Issue Habeas Corpus Writ, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 1923),
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archivefree/pdf?res=940DE2D91339E133A25750C2A9639C946395D6CF; Craig Contempt Case
Moves Ahead, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 1923), http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archivefree/pdf?res=9405E1DB1639EF3ABC4850DFB5668389639EDE.
266

ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT: CHIEF JUSTICE 144 (1964).

267

Letter from William H. Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Robert A. Taft, son
of William H. Taft (May 6, 1928) (on file in the Library of Congress). Craig seems to have had
a combative history with judges. In 1919, a New York state trial judge held him in contempt.
See Court Fines Craig $250 for Contempt, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 1919),
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In 1925, the Court issued two decisions further shaping the judiciary’s contempt
authority. By the time Taft became chief justice, he was concerned with two aspects
of the judicial contempt authority that he believed, if left unchecked, could enable a
tyrannical judiciary, particularly in light of Shipp.
The first decision arose from a challenge to the President’s power to pardon a
convicted person. The Constitution expressly grants to the President the authority to
pardon a person convicted of crimes, and since the nation’s founding, presidents had
pardoned persons judicially convicted of contempt. 268 On November 24, 1920, Judge
Kenesaw Landis issued an injunction against Philip Grossman, a Chicago barkeep. 269
The injunction was basically a judicial order to Grossman to desist from serving
alcohol in violation of the Volstead Act, and Landis issued it at the behest of the
Department of Justice.270 Grossman violated the injunction and continued to sell
liquor.271 He was prosecuted for contempt, found guilty, and sentenced to a year in
prison and a one thousand dollar fine.272 He remained free from prison on bail while
he appealed his conviction.273 In December 1923, President Coolidge commuted
Grossman’s sentence to the fine, and after Grossman paid the fine, Coolidge pardoned
him.274 The Chicago Daily Tribune, excoriated Coolidge for the pardon.275 In response
to the pardon, United States District Court Judge James Herbert Wilkerson, who had
replaced Landis after Landis resigned his judgeship to become the fulltime
commissioner of baseball, ordered Grossman into confinement.276 Grossman
challenged Wilkerson’s order in district court, and a two-judge panel consisting of
Judge George Albert Carpenter and Wilkerson determined that the judicial contempt
power was not “subject to the good will of the executive.” 277 Although Wilkerson and
Carpenter were confronted with an issue of first impression, their decision represented
a significant judicially imposed constraint on the Executive Branch. 278
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archivefree/pdf?res=9400E5DF123BEE32A25757C0A9649D946896D6CF.
268

Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108 (1925).

269

See United States v. Grossman, 1 F.2d 941, 942 (D.N.D.Ill. 1924); see also He Must Go
to
Jail
to
Win
His
Freedom,
CHI.
TRIB.
(Dec.
26,
1923),
http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1923/12/26/page/1/article/he-must-go-to-jail-to-winfreedom.
270

National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305, 314 (1919).

271

Grossman, 267 U.S. at 107.

272

Id.

273

See Grossman, 1 F.2d at 942.

274

Grossman, 267 U.S. at 107.

275

For Sale: 1 Nice Pardon: Apply Philip Grossman, CHI. TRIB. (May 17, 1924).

276

Grossman, 267 U.S. at 107.

277

Grossman, 1 F.2d at 943.

278

Id. at 943. Wilkerson in a concurrence argued:

If the President has the power to grant the pardon in this case, what becomes of the
sanctity of decrees against confiscatory acts of the agents of government, state and
national? What becomes of injunctive orders under the interstate commerce, antitrust
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On May 2, 1924, Landis appeared before the Senate’s Extraordinary Investigation
Committee.279 During his testimony, Landis disavowed any knowledge that he
provided a newspaper the following quote: “Just why may we expect $1,800 a year
probation agents to stand up four-square for law enforcement with the President
granting a pardon.”280 However, in his personal correspondences, it is clear that he
permitted an interview with the Hearst International Newspaper Syndicate on
February 6, 1924, and criticized Coolidge’s pardon to Grossman. 281Initially, the Senate
and kindred statutes? What becomes of the authority of the courts to protect the citizen
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution, against irreparable
injury to life and property? It was well said that the power to tax is the power to destroy;
it is just as true that the power to pardon for contempt is the power to destroy judicial
authority.
Id. at 954. Of note, Taft later became critical of Carpenter’s judicial acumen. He asked Judge
Evan Albert Evans, a Woodrow Wilson appointee on the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit to investigate Carpenter. See Letter from William H. Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme
Court, to Evan A. Evans, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Apr. 9, 1928)
(on file in the Library of Congress). Evans responded:
Since 1916 I have heard almost constant complaints about Carpenter’s work. These
came from district judges, the district attorney, and numerous trial lawyers. These
complaints generally include indifference and inattention to duties and an absence of
required industry. The criticisms have increased each year. Last fall it nearly reached
the boiling point over which the associate district attorney made oral complain to Judge
Alschuler. I am satisfied the complaints are justified . . . Judge Carpenter does not seem
to cooperate. He has a marked aversion for critical cases and common-law actions. The
parties complain that he only sits a half day when he has a jury trial and often an hour
late when he opens his court.
Letter from Evan A. Evans, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, to William
H. Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Apr. 5, 1928) (on file in the Library of Congress).
279

Investigation of Honorable Harry M. Daughtery, Formerly Attorney Gen. of the U.S.,
Hearings Before the Select Comm. on Investigation of the Attorney Gen., U.S. S., Sixty-Eighth
Cong., First Session, Pursuant to S. Res 157, Directing a Comm. to Investigate the Failure of
the Attorney Gen. to Prosecute or Defend Certain Criminal and Civil Actions, Wherein the
Gov’t is Interested, 68th Cong. 935-55 (1924) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Kenesaw M.
Landis).
280

Hearings, supra note 279, at 935-55; PIETRUSZA, supra note 59, at 218. Newspapers
carried Landis’ testimony, and typical of headlines was the Reading Eagle’s Saloon Man’s
Pardon Puzzles Judge Landis, READING EAGLE, May 2, 1924, at 30; see also Senate Calls
Landis in Sift of Rum Pardon: Ex Judge to Tell of Grossman’s Case, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 30, 1924);
Daugherty is Target in Plan of Senators for Criminal Action, TOLEDO BLADE (May 8, 1924).
281 Letter from Kenesaw M. Landis, Judge, Northern District of Illinois, to Louis R. Glavis,
Employee, U.S. Dept. of the Interior (Feb. 6, 1924) (on file with the Kenesaw Landis Papers in
the Chicago Historical Society). Landis wrote to Glavis,

It is the pulling and hauling process by political gentlemen in a position to elect
delegates to a convention that will choose a successor to the official who temporarily
happens to be exercising the pardon power that discredits the whole thing . . . You will
understand these observations are only by way of suggestions to you and are not to be
quoted. This is solely because when I get ready to talk about this fraud again, I shall
want to choose my own language. I can only repeat to you that I think the Grossman
pardon was dishonestly induced.
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committee was not focused on Coolidge’s pardon to Grossman, although Landis
attempted to steer the committee in that direction. Rather, the committee centered its
attention on corruption in the Justice Department under Attorney General Harry
Daugherty.282 Taft became furious with Landis over his testimony because he believed
that no judge, or former judge, should openly criticize the sitting President over an
issue the judge had presided over.283 Interestingly, Coolidge distrusted Attorney
General Daugherty and had asked a willing Taft to privately encourage Daugherty to
resign.284
In Ex Parte Grossman, Taft authored a unanimous decision in which the Court
determined that the presidential “pardon power” applied to federal criminal contempt
convictions.285 He observed that presidential pardons had been issued against contempt
convictions during the previous eighty-five years without appeal.286 However, Taft
realized that this fact alone was hardly dispositive to the constitutional issue in front
of the Court, and he reached to British common law predating the Constitution
regarding the monarchal authority to pardon contempts for the purpose of articulating
that the presidential power to pardon was simply an extension of British practice. 287
Taft then turned to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 in which the participants
determined that the only bar to the exercise of the pardoning power was in regard to
impeachments.288 Led by Taft, the Court decided that all other “offenses against the
United States” were within the scope of the power to pardon.289 Taft conceded, as
Wilkerson and Carpenter had pointed out, that the term “crimes and misdemeanors”
were clarified by the Court in 1812 in United States v. Hudson and Goodwin290 to
mean only those acts which Congress prohibited and that had a punishment affixed by
statute to the prohibition.291 However, he countered that “offenses against the United
States” were not exclusive to crimes and misdemeanors because the contempt
authority had evolved since the Constitution’s enactment. 292
To Taft, the most important aspect to the decision appears to have been a question
relating to the Constitution’s separation of powers. Wilkerson and Carpenter had
concluded that the Executive Branch’s exercise of the pardon power undermined the
Id. Although there appears to be no evidence of collusion between Landis and Hearst, it does
appear suspicious that Hearst’s newspapers had attacked Taft at this time.
282

See generally Hearings, supra note 279, at 935-55.

283

PIETRUSZA, supra note 59, at 215.

284

WILLIAM A. COOK, KING OF THE BOOTLEGGERS: A BIOGRAPHY OF GEORGE REMUS 85
(2008). Taft had been friendly with Daugherty for several years and Daugherty often served as
Taft’s “conduit” to Harding.
285

Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 121 (1925).

286

Id. at 118-19.

287

Id. at 111.

288

Id. at 112.

289

Id.

290

United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812).

291

Grossman, 267 U.S. at 114.

292

Id. at 115-17.
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Judicial Branch.293 Taft countered that the lifetime tenure of judges and the
constitutional prohibition against diminishing judicial salaries served as a check
against arbitrary presidential action.294 Tellingly, after noting other constitutional
checks against each of the federal government’s branches, he emplaced into the
decision the following phrase:
[W]hile the Constitution has made the Judiciary as independent of the other
branches as is practicable, it is, as often remarked, the weakest of the three.
It must look for a continuity of necessary cooperation, in the possible
reluctance of either of the other branches, to the force of public opinion. 295
Taft cited no case law for this statement, but it was a strong indication that he believed
the Judicial Branch should be constrained in using its authority. In contrast to its
excoriation of Coolidge, the Chicago Daily Tribune favorably reported on the decision
with the headline “President Can Pardon Guilty of Contempt.”296
Before the Court granted certiorari in Grossman, Taft spoke to the student body
of Columbia University’s law school.297 His speech, titled “Our Chief Magistrate and
his Powers,” reflected a book Taft first published in 1916, but was later published by
the university in a significantly lengthened format. 298 Although the speech centered on
the President’s authority as Commander in Chief, he analyzed the relationship
between the judiciary’s contempt authority and the President’s authority to pardon:
There is a question whether the President’s power of pardon extends to the
case of one sentenced to imprisonment for contempt by a federal court . . .
It is objected that this power of contempt is used by the court to enforce his
judgments and that if the President could intervene and paralyze the
instrument in the hand of the Court to enforce its judgment, he would not
be pardoning crime, but would be obstructing the Court in its administration
of justice.299
Taft then evidenced how he would decide Grossman by articulating that in instances
where a court issues a contempt sentence to “vindicate its own authority,”—e.g., a
criminal contempt—the President had a constitutional power to issue a pardon.300
One day before hearing argument in Grossman, Taft complained to his daughter
that, because of low judicial salaries, there were too many judges “who are failures in

293

Id. at 119.

294

Id.

295

Id. at 120.

296

President Can Pardon Guilty of Contempt, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 2, 1925, at 1.

297

William Howard Taft, The Presidency, It’s Powers, Duties, Responsibilities, and
Limitations: Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers (1915-16) (lectures by William Howard Taft
during the winter session of 1915-16, also known as the Blumberg Lectures).
298

Id.; WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS (1916).

299

Id.

300

Id.
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the profession and who never would be thought of, but for the lack of real timber.” 301
Taft did not directly implicate Landis as part of the problem of judicial competency or
a lack of ethics, but this is not surprising because Landis had already left the bench to
become baseball commissioner.302 Taft placed this criticism alongside the comment
that the Court had “heard some important cases, and we are going to hear some more
in these coming weeks.”303 Contemporaneously, he wrote to Senator Augustus Stanley
of Kentucky, “While it was essential to give to the Court greater control over its own
docket to determine cases of Constitutional importance, trust should also be given to
the Court to police the judiciary.”304 Grossman reflects the Court exercising a
“policing power” over the lower judiciary’s assertions of its own authority, and it is,
at a minimum, circumstantially coincidental that Taft, as previously noted in regarding
the establishment of a judicial conference, was at the same time trying to convince
Congress that the Court had to play a greater role in regulating the federal judiciary.
One week after listening to the arguments in Grossman, Taft informed his son Charles,
“[The Court had] been pushing along through a docket of select cases and [has] had
three very important constitutional questions put to us. One as to whether the President
can pardon contempts under the Volstead Act.” 305 He similarly expressed the
constitutional importance of Grossman to his brother Horace and emphasized that the
Volstead Act was not a constraint on the President’s pardon authority. 306
While the Court in Grossman recognized the existence of a constitutional check
against contempts, in Cooke v. United States,307 the justices placed an implied
constitutional constraint on the judicial contempt authority. Taft also authored the
unanimous decision in Cooke, and it was issued almost contemporaneously with
Grossman.308 Cooke arose from an appeal against a contempt conviction in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Texas.309 In 1923, Judge James C. Wilson

301 Letter from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Helen Herron
Taft, wife of William Howard Taft (Nov. 30, 1924) (on file in the Library of Congress).
302

See supra note 69 and accompanying text.

303

Letter from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Helen Herron
Taft, wife of William Howard Taft (Nov. 20, 1924) (on file in the Library of Congress).
304 Letter from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Augustus
Stanley, U.S. Senator, Ky. (Dec. 5, 1924) (on file in the Library of Congress).
305 Letter from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Charles P. Taft,
son of William Howard Taft (Dec. 7, 1924) (on file in the Library of Congress).
306

Letter from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Horace D. Taft,
brother of William H. Taft (Dec. 7, 1924) (on file in the Library of Congress). The day before
the Court issued Grossman, Taft complained to his son Robert that the Court was going to issue
forty opinions and could only dedicate two minutes to the decision. Letter from William Howard
Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Robert Taft, son of William Howard Taft (Mar. 1,
1925) (on file in the Library of Congress).
307

Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925).

308

Id. Cooke was argued on March 20, 1925, and issued on April 13, 1925. Id. at 517.
Grossman was argued on December 1, 1924, and issued on March 2, 1925. Ex parte Grossman,
267 U.S. 87, 87 (1925).
309

Cooke, 267 U.S. at 518.
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adjudged attorney Clay Cooke and his client, J.L. Walker, guilty of contempt. 310 J.
Frank Norris—a leading minister on the side of Prohibition and against the teaching
of evolution—had criticized Wilson for siding with “wets” against prohibitionists and
the Ku Klux Klan in 1922.311 Walker was a defendant in a series of bankruptcy suits
involving his grain storage company, and after losing the first case, Cooke attempted
to have Wilson recuse himself from the other pending trials. 312 Unlike Victor Berger,
Cooke did not file a formal affidavit with the court and instead instructed Walker to
deliver a personal letter to the judge.313 Cooke’s letter was intemperate. He not only
accused Wilson of bias against Walker, but also added, “I had believed that Your
Honor was big enough and broad enough to overcome the personal prejudice against
the defendant Walker, which I knew to exist, but I find that in this fond hope I was
mistaken.”314
On February 26, 1923, Wilson directed the marshal to arrest both Walker and
Cooke and commenced a criminal contempt proceeding. 315 Cooke appeared before
Wilson and motioned the court to grant a continuance in order to prepare for the
contempt trial, but Wilson refused to grant a delay. 316 Wilson also denied Cooke the
ability to present mitigating evidence, including the fact that he had written the letter
on the advice of another legal counsel. 317 During the contempt proceeding, Wilson
accused Walker of employing a private detective to attempt to bribe the jury foreman
in his bankruptcy trial, and Wilson linked this accusation as proof that Cooke’s letter
was intended to be contemptuous. 318 Wilson sentenced both Cooke and Walker to jail
for thirty days and to pay a five hundred dollar fine. 319 The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit reversed Walker’s conviction, but it upheld Cooke’s conviction and
sentence.320
Taft began the decision by observing that had Cooke merely intended to provide
notice to Wilson that he did not want to file a formal affidavit, such a notice would not
have constituted contempt.321 Instead, Taft determined that Cooke intended to
“characterize in severe language, personally derogatory to the judge, his conduct of
the pending case.”322 Taft next delineated why Wilson should have recused himself
310

Id.

311

BARRY HANKINS, GOD’S RASCAL: J. FRANK NORRIS
SOUTHERN FUNDAMENTALISM 48 (1996).
312

Cooke, 267 U.S. at 518.

313

Id. at 517.

314

Id.

315

Id.

316

Id.

317

Id.

318

Id. at 518.
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Id.

320

Id. at 517.

321

Id. at 533.

322

Id. at 533-34.
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from the contempt hearing. He noted that Cooke’s private conduct was not tantamount
to an act in open court such as when a witness or spectator causes a disturbance, and
therefore, the judge is not intended as a victim of the contempt. 323 In instances where
this occurs, Taft recognized that a judge must act quickly for a “summary vindication”
of the “court’s dignity and authority.” 324 Moreover, as Taft pointed out, unlike Ex
Parte Terry, in which the contempt occurred in open court, Cooke had the letter
privately delivered to Wilson.325 Coupled with the fact that Wilson refused to permit
Cooke and Walker time to prepare their defense and did not formally advise them of
the charges, Taft determined that the contempt procedure failed due process. 326
Equally important, Taft led the unanimous Court to apply the right to an impartial
judge to contempt trials by strongly advising that on remand, Wilson should ask the
senior judge of his district assign another judge. 327
IV. IMPARTIAL JUSTICE: TUMEY V. OHIO
Legal historian Daniel Kyvig has noted that after the Civil War, Ohio was the
center of the temperance movement. 328 The most powerful political organization
dedicated to Prohibition, the Anti-Saloon League, originated in Cleveland in 1895.329
In one of the first challenges to the Eighteenth Amendment, Hawke v. Smith,330 the
Court concluded that Ohio’s method of bypassing a referendum by the voting
population and reserving to the state legislature the authority to vote on the
Amendment was constitutional.331 The Ohio Constitution mandated that the state’s
votes to amend the U.S. Constitution could only occur by a general referendum, yet
the U.S. Constitution enabled Congress to determine on an amendment-byamendment basis whether the amendatory processes would occur by state legislatures
or by the general votes.332 The Court easily resolved the issue by finding for the
supremacy of Congress over the Ohio legislature and then applying the plain text of
323

Id. at 534.

324

Id.

325

Id.

326

Id. at 537.

327

Id. at 539. Taft placed the following language into the decision:

The case before us is one in which the issue between the judge and the parties had come
to involve marked personal feeling that did not make for an impartial and calm judicial
consideration and conclusion, as the statement of the proceedings abundantly shows.
Id. Although I do not argue this point in the text, it may be possible to apply Taft’s reasoning in
Cooke to a broader proposition that judicial campaign promises should serve as a definitive part
of any disqualification test on challenges to a judge’s service on a trial in which the promise is
related to the type of cause before the court.
328 Daniel E. Kyvig, Ohio and the Shaping of the United States Constitution, in MICHAEL
LES BENEDICT AND JOHN WINKLER, THE HISTORY OF OHIO LAW 352, 352 (2004).
329

Id. at 353.
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Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
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Id.
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Id. at 229.
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Article VI to define the term legislature as a voting body elected by a state’s voting
process.333
A. Tumey’s Background
Despite the Prohibition aspects to Edward Tumey’s appeal, Tumey is certainly not
a narrow decision on the efficacy of liquor courts or prohibition enforcement. Had the
Eighteenth Amendment not come into being, an appeal involving the relationship
between pecuniary interest and the right to an impartial judge might have come to the
Court during Taft’s tenure eventually. Early in the nation’s history, state legislatures
enabled the creation of inferior courts, in part, to reduce the amount of work conducted
by trial judges.334 Inferior courts generally did not have the authority to convict a
person of a felony, and such courts usually assessed fines rather than jail sentences.335
But some of these courts were only able to function through the collection of fines,
and judicial salaries as well as police salaries were likewise contingent on the
collection of fines.336
The Supreme Court generically upheld the constitutionality of inferior courts in
1917 in Hatranft v. Mullowny, Judge of the Police Court of the District of Columbia.337
In 1919, in Pacific Gas & Electric Company v. Sacramento, the Court determined that
sentences adjudged by juryless “inferior courts” did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. 338 In 1899, the city of Sacramento enacted an ordinance which required
transportation companies to “sprinkle water” along track-ways to reduce airborne dust
and grime.339 A local gas company operated an inter-city street railway but refused to
comply with the ordinance, and the city’s “inferior court” assessed a fine against the
company’s directors.340 The California Court of Appeals determined that the exercise
of the state’s “police power” was inherently constitutional and that the state legislature
possessed the authority under California’s Constitution to delegate this police power
to municipalities.341 The Court did not take exception to the state court’s analysis. 342
Thus, along with the social, economic, religious, and political forces underlying
Prohibition, the origins of Tumey should also be considered in light of the “police
333

See id. at 227.

334

See, e.g., Elizabeth Dale, Criminal Justice in the United States, 1790-1920: A
Government of Laws or Men, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 133, 153-55
(Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlin eds., 2008).
335

Id.

336

Id. For a more antiquated study on this subject, but perhaps reflecting the acceptance of
inferior courts, see HORACE ELISHA SCUDDER, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 275
(1890).
337

Hartranft v. Mullowny, 247 U.S. 295 (1917).

338

Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Sacramento, 251 U.S. 22 (1919).

339

Id. at 23.

340

Pac. Gas & Elec Co. v. Police Ct. of Sacramento, 28 Cal. App. 412, 413 (1915).

341

Id. at 416.

342 Id. at 415-16. Much of the state appellate court’s decision discusses the reasonableness
of the ordinance and that court noted several other state appeals court decisions upholding
similar ordinances. Id. at 418-19.
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power” conferred on the states, as this power was upheld in both Hantraft and Pacific
Gas and Electric. That is, Ohio’s use of inferior courts as a means of enforcing both a
federal and state prohibition was not per se unconstitutional.
It is also necessary to understand Ohio’s inferior court construct at the time of
Tumey. In the first quarter of the twentieth century, Ohio’s inferior court structure
could be characterized as a “hodge-podge” system of trial courts. The state’s supreme
court supervised not only two courts of appeal, courts of probate, and county trial
courts, but also justice of the peace courts, police courts, municipal courts, and
mayors’ courts.343 The state was divided into eighty-eight counties containing 753
villages and 110 cities.344 Hamilton County, where Tumey lived and where North
College Hill exists, had a population of 589,356 people across its 407 square miles.345
Cincinnati, the county’s most populous city had a population of 541,160, while North
College Hill had a population of 4,139.346
Shortly after the Volstead Act, Ohio’s legislature enacted a statute that enabled
municipalities to fund prohibition enforcement through the collection of fines
adjudged in juryless inferior courts. 347 Ohio’s law permitted the creation of municipal
“liquor courts” throughout the state but not in major metropolitan centers. 348
Apparently, the state legislature concluded that such “liquor courts,” when placed
outside of the state’s major cities, created an effective cordon to prevent alcohol from
entering cities where the police were unenthusiastic about enforcing Prohibition. 349 In
1919, North College Hill issued an ordinance that created a “liquor court.”350 The state
laws and the town’s ordinance enabled fines and seizures of private property to be
used to fund not only the costs of the court and law enforcement, but also costs to
supplement the income of judicial officers, marshals, deputies, and prosecuting
attorneys.351 In various localities, including North College Hill, elected mayors served
as inferior court judicial officers.352 Ohio was not, however, a state bereft of judicial
ethics. The Ohio legislature had enacted a code requiring judicial recusal in cases in
which a judge had a vested interest in the outcome. 353 The legislature did not
specifically include inferior courts or mayors serving in a judicial capacity in this

343

PAUL F. DOUGLAS, THE MAYORS’ COURTS OF HAMILTON COUNTY, 1-3 (1933).

344

Id.

345

Id. at 6.

346

Id. at 6.

347

Tumey v. State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 517 (1927) (citing OHIO GEN. CODE § 6212-37).

348 See OHIO GEN. CODE § 6212-37. “The council of any city or village may, by ordinance,
authorize the use of any part of the fines collected for the violation of any law prohibiting the
manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors, for the purpose of hiring attorneys, detectives or
secret service officers to secure the enforcement of such prohibition law.” Id.
349

Tumey v. State of Ohio, 25 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 580, 592 (1925).

350

Id. at 582.
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Carey v. Ohio, 40 Ohio St. 121 (Ohio 1904) (citing OHIO REV. STAT. § 550 (1892)).
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code.354 On the other hand, in 1917, the Ohio Supreme Court decided that although
liquor courts were “inferior courts,” persons adjudged guilty in such courts had the
right to appeal.355 Thus, as of 1925, it remained an open question as to whether a liquor
court judge’s denial of a motion for recusal was appealable to the state trial courts or
courts of appeal.
North College Hill’s mayor, A.R. Pugh, also served as the town’s sole liquor court
magistrate and during the court’s two year existence, he received over six hundred
dollars from the fines assessed against defendants.356 In 1925, Pugh led an alcohol raid
that resulted in law enforcement officers entering local carpenter Edward Tumey’s
house, where they discovered illicit alcohol. 357 This raid led to Tumey’s prosecution
in the municipality’s liquor court.358 Of the one hundred dollar fine assessed against
Tumey, Pugh collected only twelve dollars.359 Tumey preserved an appeal by objecting
to Pugh’s service as a judge on the basis that Pugh was an interested party who had a
pecuniary interest in the outcome of the trial.360 After all, if Tumey were acquitted,
Pugh would receive no monies.
Tumey appealed to Judge Stanley Struble on the Court of Common Pleas, and in
cutting language, Struble reversed Tumey’s conviction and fine. 361 A 1988
biographical article described Stuble as “a teetotaler but not a prohibitionist” and went
on to note that Tumey was a local carpenter and not a notorious bootlegger. 362 The
author of the biographical article also reported that Struble was angry with law
enforcement officials for arresting and prosecuting working citizens instead of
focusing on well-known gangsters.363 Another character aspect of Struble is that he
354

See generally OHIO REV. STAT. § 550.

355

Heninger v. Davis, 96 Ohio St. 205 (1917).

356

Tumey, 25 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) at 583. According to Judge Struble, in 1925, Pugh ran for
office with the promise to vigorously enforce the Crabbe Act and maximize the use of the
municipality’s liquor court. Id. Struble’s characterization is particularly apt, as follows:
It was admitted that Mayor Pugh was at the time, a taxpayer in the village of North
College Hill, and at the time of the resignation of Mayor Vogelpohl, his predecessor,
on account of his disinclination to operate a liquor court, in the public agitation that
followed Vogelpohl's resignation as to whether or not the court should be continued as
an enterprise of the village, Mayor Pugh in public speeches advocated the continuance
of this liquor court because of the "financial" benefit to the village. Mayor Pugh was
appointed as the successor of Mayor Vogelpohl.
Id.
357 ERIC T. KASPER, IMPARTIAL JUSTICE: THE REAL SUPREME COURT CASES THAT DEFINE THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A NEUTRAL AND DETACHED DECISION-MAKER 81-82 (2013).
358

Id. at 83.

359

Id. at 84.

360

Tumey, 25 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) at 583.

361

Tumey v. State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 515 (1927).

362

Jerry Hurter, The Way We Were: Don Quixote Judge and Cause Celebre, Kangaroo
Court Tyranny K.O.’d Sixty-One Years Ago, CINCINNATI MAG., Mar. 1988, at 43.
363 Id.; see also CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, supra note 6; Stanley Struble Dies Near 90th
Birthday; Famed as Judge of Plain Common Sense, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Feb. 4, 1955, at 40.
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appears to have been popular with southern Ohio’s ethnic German population for
defending the teaching of the German language during World War I.364 One could
conclude that Struble was concerned about the due process rights of minorities and
individual citizens against Ohio’s assertion of its “police power.”
Struble determined that because Pugh and others benefited from convictions,
Tumey was deprived of the right to due process of law. 365 Midway through the
decision, he penned:
The power and authority given of making of mayors of villages special
instruments in the enforcement of prohibition was bad enough, but
considering this in connection with what has been done in other ways for
prohibition enforcement, we are forced to conclude that we have a situation
that seriously menaces the liberties of the people.366
Although his disgust with the state’s prohibition enforcement scheme appeared
throughout the decision, Struble carefully analyzed due process in light of not only
state constitutional law, but also the common law predating the Constitution. 367 Pugh
had argued that because a liquor court could not assess a sentence of imprisonment, it
was a lesser court, immune from the requirement of a jury trial and, therefore, the rules
governing recusal did not apply.368 Struble countered that persons who were unable to
pay a fine would be placed in prison to work off the fine at a rate of sixty cents per
day, and a person could be confined for nine years after being found guilty of a second
offense.369 Struble cited to Schick v. United States370 for the proposition that because
violations of both the Volstead Act and Ohio’s prohibition laws were rooted in the
Eighteenth Amendment, Tumey’s offenses were of a constitutional magnitude and,
therefore, could not be considered as a petty offense akin to public swearing. 371
Struble next discounted Pugh’s argument that because the Ohio legislature had
exempted mayors in the judicial ethics statutes by omission, Pugh was free to ignore
Tumey’s objection to his service as a judicial officer.372 Because the state constitution
listed a series of inalienable rights, including the right to seek redress in the courts,
Struble found that Pugh had an obligation to at least consider whether he had a duty

This article is an obituary in which Hamilton County’s municipal judges recalled Struble, who
had reached the age of ninety. The obituary states, “His passing, the courts and the bar have lost
a judge whose fairness and courage have brought national recognition to the bench of Hamilton
County, and the people of this community have lost an outstanding citizen.” Id.
364

Letter from H. L. Lebkuecher, H. L. Lebkuecher Cigars, to William Howard Taft, Chief
Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (March 11, 1927) (on file in the Library of Congress).
365

Tumey, 25 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) at 581.
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Id. at 593-94.
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Id. at 586-87.
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Id. at 595-96.
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Id. at 597.
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Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 78 (1904).
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Tumey, 25 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) at 598-600.
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Id. at 586.
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to disqualify himself in light of Tumey’s due process rights but had not done so. 373
Pugh relied on an 1881 Ohio Supreme Court decision which had determined that the
term “pecuniary interest” did not include a dependency on “court cost” to supplement
income.374 He argued that his collection of a share of the assessed fines was not, alone,
a basis for mandatory recusal. 375 Struble distinguished Tumey’s appeal from the 1881
decision because Pugh had collected for his own use a greater amount of money than
simply the costs of running the court.376 Ohio’s First District Court of Appeal reversed
Judge Struble’s ruling with little comment, and the Ohio Supreme Court refused to
grant Tumey a further appeal.377
Then, Tumey appealed for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, and Taft
convinced the other eight justices that the appeal was of a constitutional magnitude. 378
Although Taft did not, in any of his surviving correspondences, discuss his view of a
judicial system that relied on mayors or justices of the peace to conduct criminal trials,
in his 1916 Kentucky Law Review article, he had disparaged the system of lesser courts
and observed that such courts were weighted against the rights of the nation’s poor.379
Perhaps presaging the Court’s grant of certiorari to Tumey’s appeal, Taft insisted that
the best means to achieve a fair and equitable system of lesser courts was to ensure
that the Supreme Court had the jurisdictional authority to take appeals from the
decisions of such courts.380
373

Id.

374

Id. at 588-89.

375

Id.

376

Id. at 589-90.

377

State v. Tumey, 22 Ohio L. R. 624 (Ohio Ct. App. 1925); Tumey v. State, 115 Ohio St
.701 (1926).
378 Barry Cushman, Inside the Taft Court: Lessons from the Docket Books, 2015 SUP. CT.
REV. 345 (2016).
379

Taft, supra note 79, at 21. Taft penned:

We have had through the country a system of civil courts conducted by men who are
not lawyers, by justices of the peace, with appeals from the justice's court to the common
pleas court, or superior court of first instance, and then with appeals through
intermediate courts of appeal to the Supreme Court. If a system could be devised that
offered greater advantage to the wealthy litigant in resisting the claims of the poor
litigant, I don't know what it is.
Id.
380

Id. Taft urged that

[t]he justices of the peace generally have very little knowledge of the law, are not men
of skill and learning, able to dispose of business promptly and accurately, and so the
cases too frequently drag along in the so-called "people's courts" until the poor litigant
is discouraged and really defeated, even when he wins in a court of last resort. The
poorer people are entitled to as good judges as the rich, and they cannot get them by
giving them an appeal to the highest court in their cases, because that involves such
delay and expense. The cutting off appeals from the people's courts to the Supreme
Court is one means of preventing that inequality between the poor and the rich litigant
that now prevails.
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B. Tumey v. Ohio: The Decision
On appeal to the Court, some of the nation’s most powerful prohibition advocates
represented the state of Ohio. The team included Attorney General Charles C. Crabbe,
Wayne Bidwell Wheeler, Edward B. Dunford, D. W. Murphy, and Charles M.
Earhart.381 Wheeler was the president of the Anti-Saloon League, a national
organization with chapters in all forty-eight states, and he was instrumental in forming
a powerful congressional alliance to enable the Volstead Act.382 In 1922, Senator John
Shields, a Tennessee Democrat, accused Wheeler of supporting Taft’s efforts to
empower the Supreme Court to temporarily assign district court judges to other
districts when vacancies occurred or when district caseloads became untenable for a
hidden purpose of bringing “avowed dry judges into wet territory.” 383 This accusation
was the opposite the Anti-Saloon League’s accusations against Taft. Dunford was the
national Anti-Saloon League’s vice president.384 Earhart was the president of the Ohio
Anti-Saloon League.385 And, Murphy was a state prosecutor who had campaigned for
the Eighteenth Amendment.386 There is a historic consensus that Wheeler was
instrumental in the election defeats of Senators Atlee Pomerene of Ohio and Owlsey
Stanley of Kentucky in 1922.387
Crabbe’s representation of Ohio is explained by his duties as Attorney General and
that Ohio did not yet have a state solicitor general. Wheeler and the other
prohibitionists, however, are a different matter. Historian Daniel Okrent, in his Last
Call: The Rise and Fall of Prohibition, described Wheeler as a powerful political
force who was instrumental in the Eighteenth Amendment’s passage and who was also
a force in reshaping the Ohio legislature.388 He represented the Ohio legislature in
Hawke v. Smith and advocated in other prohibition suits before the Court. 389 Wheeler

Id.
381

However, the names of the state’s attorneys are note listed on the decision. See CLEMENT
E. VOSE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: AMENDMENT POLITICS AND SUPREME COURT LITIGATION
SINCE 1900 97 (1972).
382

OKRENT, supra note 108, at 39.

383

MASON, supra note 266, at 101.

384

SIGMA PHI EPSILON, THE SIGMA PHI EPSILON JOURNAL 232 (1921).
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THE PHI DELTA THETA FRATERNITY, THE SCROLL OF PHI DELTA THETA, VOL. XXXIV 417
(1910).
386 THE RAILROAD COMMISSION OF
TO THE GOVERNOR 70 (1911).

OHIO, REPORT TO THE RAILROAD COMMISSION OF OHIO

387

OKRENT, supra note 108, at 229.

388

Id. at 39.

389

Wheeler also filed an amicus brief in Lambert v. Yellowly, 272 U.S. 581 (1926), a
decision in which the Court determined that Congress had the power to prohibit the use of
alcohol in prescription medicines, Cunard v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923), which determined
that Congress had the authority to extend the Eighteenth Amendment’s prohibitions to foreign
vessels using United States ports, and, The National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920).
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and Taft had known each other for at least five years before Tumey.390 In 1922,
Wheeler led the Anti-Saloon League to openly support Taft’s efforts to increase the
number of district court judges after its leaders had initially opposed Taft’s plan. 391 In
1923, Taft lauded Wheeler to his brother Horace in writing, “Wheeler is a man of real
power and great common sense.”392 One year later, Attorney General Harlan Fiske
Stone inquired to Taft about whether Roscoe J. Mauck, an Ohio judge on the state
court of common pleas, was a reasonable candidate to be nominated for a federal
judgeship.393 Mauck, unfortunately, had appeared drunk in public prior to the
Eighteenth Amendment, but the Anti-Saloon League had later lauded his decisions in
upholding the Crabbe Act, and he did not oppose prohibition measures during the state
Republican Convention in 1924.394 Taft replied to Stone that he had sought out
Wheeler’s opinion to determine whether the Anti-Saloon League would oppose
Mauck and that Wheeler conveyed back to him “that while at the state convention
[Mauck] had kept straight, he was very much afraid that given the independence of a
position on the Federal Bench in the larger cities, Mauck might yield again, to
liquor.”395 In January 1926, Wheeler felt comfortable enough to ask Taft to lobby the
justices against narrowing Ohio’s conspiracy laws in a pending appeal unrelated to
Tumey’s.396
By late 1926, Taft’s view of Wheeler appears to have changed. In November,
shortly after the parties submitted their initial briefs to the Court but before argument,
the Anti-Saloon League published an article about the Chief Justice which claimed
that he had opposed exempting beer and light wines from the Eighteenth Amendment
“because it would leave a hole through which a coach and four could be driven and
the effectiveness of the law destroyed.” 397 Taft, in fact, had given a newspaper
390 Letter from Wayne Wheeler, President, Anti-Saloon League, to William Howard Taft,
Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Aug. 26, 1922) (on file in the Library of Congress).
391

Id.

392 Letter from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Horace D. Taft,
brother of William Howard Taft (Nov. 11, 1923) (on file in the Library of Congress). The
remainder of Taft’s comment regarding Wheeler is:

He is miles away from the pestiferous Anderson, the head of the Anti-Saloon League in
New York, who has brought much discredit on the movement. I do not doubt Wheeler
sees the great advantage of using the Civil Service Commission to get good men into
the prohibition department, but I presume that in order to hold his position among
Congressmen he has found it necessary not to be active in that particular direction,
because his activity would be a sin against the Holy Ghost, with the ordinary
congressman and senator.
Id.
393 Letter from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Harlan F. Stone,
Attorney General (Dec. 7, 1924) (on file in the Library of Congress).
394

Id.

395

Id.

396

Letter from Wayne B. Wheeler, President, Anti-Saloon League, to William Howard Taft,
Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Jan. 26, 1926) (on file in the Library of Congress).
397 Letter from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Horace D. Taft,
brother of William H. Taft (Nov. 12, 1926) (on file in the Library of Congress).
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interview in late 1918, while serving as a Yale law professor, in which he had made
this comment, but he had done so for purposes other than supporting a stricter
prohibition amendment.398 Taft instead argued that the law had to be entirely
prohibitory or not exist at all, because exceptions for beer and “light” wines would
make the amendment unenforceable.399 Taft complained to his brother Horace, “One
of the features of the fight over prohibitionists and anti-prohibition is the utter
unscrupulousness of both sides in the use of evidence.”400 Wheeler attempted to assure
Taft that he had nothing to do with the Anti-Saloon League’s article and wrote the
chief justice a formal apology.401
On March 6, 1927, when Taft wrote to his son Charles that the Crabbe Act was
unconstitutional, he also noted that the decision “necessitated an examination of
English and American law” and was disappointed in both Wheeler and Tumey’s
counsel, Edward Moulinier.402 He further wrote, “The truth is that the case was not
fully prepared on either side. We required them to go back and file new briefs, and
after that, we found that there was a great deal of work to be done by the Court.” 403
What Taft did not mention is that Wheeler and Mouliner were both late on their briefs,
and they filed a total of four apiece.404 Wheeler argued to the Court that because the
Fourteenth Amendment did not require trials by jury, state legislatures were free to
create courts as deemed necessary.405 Wheeler added that because several states, since
the beginning of the nation, had permitted judges to keep adjudged fines as part of
their salary, due process did not prohibit this practice. 406 The state’s third and final
argument was that the fine collected from Tumey was miniscule and, therefore, not
worthy of the Court’s time. 407
Taft began the decision by narrowly fashioning the question before the Court. The
Court addressed the narrow issue of whether Ohio’s scheme of permitting a mayor to
serve in a judicial position in which the mayor possessed a pecuniary interest in the
outcome of the trial failed due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.408 Following
398

Id.

399

Id.

400

Id.

401

Letter from Wayne B. Wheeler, President, Anti-Saloon League, to William Howard Taft,
Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Nov. 12, 1926) (on file in the Library of Congress); Letter
from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Wayne B. Wheeler,
President, Anti-Saloon League (Nov. 13, 1926) (on file in the Library of Congress).
402
Letter from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Charles P. Taft,
son of William H. Taft (Mar. 6, 1927) (on file in the Library of Congress).
403 Id. Little is known about Edward Moulinier. He was a local Ohio attorney who fought
against the Crabbe Act. See Edward Moulinier, Fought Prohibition, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1951,
at 92.
404 Wayne B. Wheeler, President, Anti-Saloon League, to William Howard Taft, Chief
Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Dec. 18, 1926) (on file in the Library of Congress).
405

Tumey v. State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 534 (1927).

406

Id.

407

Id.

408

Id. at 514-15.
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this question, he detailed the various Ohio statutes and municipal ordinances that
created the North College Hill court. Then, he went on to note that between May 11,
1923, and December 31, 1923, the town court collected over $20,000, of which Mayor
Pugh received $696.35.409 The county marshals, inspectors, detectives, and other city
and county employees received $2,697.75 while a prosecutor received $1,769.50. 410
Had the hundreds of trials resulted in acquittals rather than convictions, none of this
money would have been available to pay the various officials involved in the
enforcement of Prohibition. 411 Taft also recognized that prior to Tumey’s trial, Pugh
had made public statements which could be construed in favor of maintaining the
liquor court.412
Next, Taft articulated a basic rule that judicial officers and persons acting in a
judicial capacity must be disqualified from adjudicating a controversy in which they
have a pecuniary interest.413 He cited to no federal judicial precedent for this principle,
but rather he turned to several state judicial decisions, all of which arose from civil
matters such as land use, probate, and debt collection. Two of these decisions
originated from railroad interests in private property. One case Taft highlighted was a
Michigan appellate decision in which jurors empaneled on a judgeless probate court
voted to assign an intestate decedent’s land for railroad use, but the jurors were
shareholders in the railroad and stood to benefit from the assignment; therefore, the
trial failed due process.414 The second decision Taft highlighted, and in his opinion,
the most important because it arose in Ohio, was Gregory v. Cleveland, Columbus, &
Cincinnati Railroad Company.415 In 1855, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld a lower
court’s determination that commissioners appointed to assess a property owner’s loss
of property resulting from a taking of land for the purpose of railroad track
construction could not have a pecuniary interest in the railroad company.416
Specifically, two of the commissioners were stockholders in the defendant railroad

409

Id. at 516-22.

410

Id.

411

Id.

412

Id. at 521.

413

Id.

414

Id. (citing Peninsular Country R.R. v. Howard, 20 Mich. 18 (1870). In this decision, the
Michigan Supreme Court noted:
The maxim that no man shall be judge in his own cause, is one deeply rooted in the
common law, and can never be overlooked anywhere, where impartial justice is one of
the objects of judicial administration. And in this special proceeding for taking the
property of individuals against their will, in which the jury act in effect as judges, in the
absence and beyond the control of the Court, we think this maxim is applicable to them
as well as judges.
Id. at 25.
415

Gregory v. Cleveland, Columbus, & Cincinnati R.R. Co., 4 Ohio St. 675 (1855).

416

Id. at 677.
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company; therefore, they had a motive to undervalue the loss of property. 417 The state
justices stated, “No man should be the judge in his own cause.” 418
It might appear, at first glance, that Taft wanted the decision to be applied narrowly
to only financial issues because, after noting the state decisions involving the necessity
of judicial disqualification in matters of a pecuniary nature, he pointed out that not all
questions of judicial disqualification involved “constitutional validity.”419 In contrast
to financial questions, Taft concluded, “[M]atters of kinship, personal bias, state
policy, remoteness of interest, would seem generally to be matters merely of
legislative discretion.”420 To this end, Taft cited to Wheeling v. Black,421 a West
Virginia decision in which that state’s supreme court determined that the state
legislature had the authority to enact a statute to prevent judicial officers from being
disqualified on the basis of also being tax-payers.422 In Wheeling, a West Virginia
municipality sued a former tax collector after claiming that the collector had
wrongfully withheld tax payments from the municipality and kept the monies for his
own enrichment.423 The trial judge was a taxpayer to the municipality, and his salary
derived from the collection of taxes. 424 The state supreme court did not consider the
municipality’s appeal on the basis of due process; rather, the court considered whether
the state legislature had the lawful authority to enact an anti-disqualification statute.425
Moreover, very little of the state supreme court’s decision focused on recusal; instead,
the state court spent much of the decision considering the collector’s evidentiary
objections as well as a petition for a change in forum. 426

417

Id.

418

Id. at 677. The state court went on to note:

We think, for the administration of justice, the safe way is, in all cases, for interested
judges to decline acting in such cases; and where it appears, on the record, that they
were interested, and acted on questions of fact, and especially when they were to select
the jury who try the facts, they should refuse to sit, and make known their interest at the
earliest stage of the proceedings.
Id. at 679.
419

Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).

420

Id.

421

Wheeling v. Black, 25 W. Va. 266, 270 (1884).

422

Id. at 279. The statute read:

No judge of any court, and no sheriff or other officer of a court, shall be disqualified
from performing his official duties with respect to any cause by reason of the fact that
he is a citizen and tax-payer of a county, district, school district, or municipal
corporation which is interested in, or a party to such cause.
W. VA. CODE § 51-3-6 (1881).
423

Wheeling, 25 W. Va. at 270.

424

Id. at 280.

425

Id. at 282.

426

See generally id.
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Prior to Tumey, the nation’s state and federal courts had not issued a dispositive
decision on the nexus between kinship and recusal. In terms of family relationships or
personal bias, Taft believed that either state legislatures or the judicial profession itself
were the proper instruments for regulating judicial conduct in matters of kinship.427
Taft was concerned with appearances, but he also did not want to criticize the past
practices of the Supreme Court. In 1933, Justice Van Devanter informed Chief Justice
Charles Evans Hughes that in Tumey, Taft approached kinship in a cautious manner
because he did not want to impugn the legacies of other justices. 428 According to Van
Devanter, Taft explained that during and after the Civil War, noted attorney David
Dudley Field argued appeals to the Court while his brother Stephen Field was a
justice.429 Justice Field was, in fact, particularly concerned about his judicial service
during Lambdin Milligan’s appeal because his brother David argued Milligan’s appeal
to the Court.430 Apparently, Taft had personal reasons for believing that, although
there was an appearance of impropriety in Justice Field’s service on appeals where his
brother argued, it was appropriate to permit the state courts and legislatures to develop
rules regarding recusal and disqualification. 431
After disposing of questions regarding kinship, personal bias, state policy, or
remoteness of interest, Taft turned to ancient rules involving the need for an impartial
judiciary as related to pecuniary interests. He did so as a response to Ohio’s assertion
that in order to determine the parameters of due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court had to:
[L]ook to those settled usages and modes of proceedings existing in the
common and statute law of England before the emigration of our ancestors,
which were shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and political
condition by having acted on them after the settlement of this country.432

427

Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).

428

Letter from Willis Van Devanter, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Charles Evans
Hughes, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Oct. 7, 1935) (on file in the Library of Congress).
429

Id.

430

Letter from Justice Stephen J. Field to Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase (June 30, 1866), in
THE SALMON CHASE PAPERS, Vol. V, 115-17 (John Niven et al. eds., 1998). Ironically, perhaps,
is the example set not only by Justice Field and merely touched upon by Chief Justice Taft that
would later prove vexatious to the Supreme Court. For instance, future Justice Abe Fortas
provided legal advice to Justice William O. Douglas including negotiating a book contract for
Douglas in 1947, but Douglas did not recuse himself from cases in which Fortas argued. See
LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY 164-65 (Yale Univ. Press ed., 1990). Although
Professor Kalman did not address Tumey in her study on Fortas, she noted that by the midtwentieth century relationships between judges and litigants had evolved into a public issue. See
id. In 1946 Justice Jackson publicly criticized Justice Hugo Black for participating in a case
where Black’s former law partner from over two decades earlier represented a party. See, e.g.,
WILLIAM WIECEK, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE BIRTH OF THE
MODERN CONSTITUTION: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1941-1953, Vol. XII, 414-16
(Stanley N. Katz ed., 2006).
431

See infra note 433.

432

Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523. The Ohio solicitor general’s brief cited to Ownbey v. Morgan,
256 U.S. 94 (1921), a property attachment and seizure decision and Murray’s Lessee v.
Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1855), a land ejectment decision. Neither of
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Taft noted that during the reign of Richard II, justices of the peace were paid for their
services out of common sheriffs’ funds, and the payment was a flat rate regardless of
whether the justices of the peace convicted or acquitted a person. 433 Although parties
to a lawsuit in medieval England were subject to the rule of “amercement pro falso
clamore,” a term denoting that the losing party had to pay the costs of a lawsuit, judges
and other judicial officers were not paid on the basis of their decisions. 434 Taft
summarized the importance of this practice: “There was at the common law the
greatest sensitiveness over the existence of any pecuniary interest however small or
infinitesimal in the justices of the peace.”435 Read in its context and given Taft’s
conservatism, it appears that Taft found it important that the laws confining English
justices of the peace to salaries remained the law of England. 436
Taft lamented that Ohio, Arkansas, Kentucky, Nebraska, North Carolina,
Maryland, Georgia, and Texas had disregarded the English standard and permitted
“inferior” judicial officers’ salaries to be paid from the collection of fines. 437 However,
judicial officer salaries in Maryland were “fixed,” and while contingent on the
collection of fines, a judge did not increase his or her salary by the numbers of
convictions.438 Both Texas’ and Georgia’s highest appeals courts had upheld the basic
construct of permitting fines to be used for judicial officer salaries. 439 In Bennett v.
State, the Texas Court of Appeals, in a very brief decision arising from a defendant’s
challenge against a misdemeanor judge, simply held that the Texas legislature had

these two decisions arose from an appeal challenging the competency of a judicial officer to
determine a cause of action.
433 Id. at 521. Taft may have oversimplified his reliance on British legal history regarding
judicial salaries. English judges could also collect fees from parties for their service as
adjudicators though such fees were paid regardless of the judicial decision. Also, because
judicial salaries often went unpaid, it was not unusual for judges to receive land grants and
pensions from large landholding aristocrats. See, e.g., WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH ET AL., A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, VOL. I 252-54 (Nabu Press ed., 1922).
434 For a history of this rule in the United States, see Lowe v. Kansas, 163 U.S. 81 (1986)
(discussing that Kansas law allows for prosecutors who engaged in malicious prosecution to be
subject to court costs after a specific finding of such by a jury upheld); Day v. Woodworth, 54
U.S. 563 (1852) (finding it constitutional that a plaintiff may be responsible for court costs);
John D. Lawson, The Action for the Malicious Prosecution of a Civil Suit, 30 AM. L. REG. 281,
364 (1882). See generally Robert W. Taylor, Restraints on Vexatious Litigation, L. MAG. &
REV. 670, 676 (1875).
435

Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523. Scholars who analyzed Caperton have overlooked Taft’s belief
that common law barred the judicial conduct at issue in Tumey. See, e.g., Andrey Spektor &
Michael Zuckerman, Judicial Recusal and Expanding Notions of Due Process, 13 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 977, 986 (2011).
436

Tumey, 273 U.S. at 521.

437

Id. at 526.

438

Id. at 527 (citing Herbert v. Baltimore County Comm’r, 55 A. 376 (Md. 1903); In re
Application of J.D. Guerrero, 10 P. 261 (Cal. 1886)).
439 See generally Wellmaker v. Terrell, 3 Ga. App. 791 (1908); Bennett v. State, 4 Tex. Ct.
App. 72 (1878).
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mandated that the payment of judicial salaries was contingent on convictions. 440 The
defendant had been convicted of operating a betting parlor, and the judge fined him
fifty dollars.441 The Texas court did not provide any due process analysis as to the
statute and, instead, focused on the judge’s adherence to a statute rather than whether
the statute was unconstitutional.442
In Wellmaker v. Terrell, the Court of Appeals of Georgia, in a lengthier analysis,
concluded that the payment of fees collected from parties in lieu of fixed judicial
salaries was not unconstitutional.443 The city of Barnseville, in conformance with
Georgia law, established an inferior court, and the judge assigned to the court also
served as a judicial clerk.444 Wellmaker had paid a bond to the court for the release of
a citizen accused of larceny while the citizen awaited trial.445 The citizen fled from the
district, and Wellmaker forfeited the bond money.446 He appealed the forfeit on the
basis that because the inferior court judge would only be paid if the citizen had been
convicted; the court possessed no jurisdiction over the bond.447 Unlike Texas, Georgia
law prohibited a judge from adjudicating a cause of action in which he had a pecuniary
interest.448 However, the state court of appeals determined that judicial payments based
on fines collected did not fall within the ambit of “pecuniary interest.” 449 Also, the
Georgia court, like its Texas counterpart, deferred to the legislature noting:
As we cannot conclude that the General Assembly of 1899 intended not to
create the court, which it solemnly declared it was creating, as well as on
account of the other reasons to which we have referred, we are constrained
to hold that the judge of the city court was not disqualified to preside in the
case now before us.450
Taft approvingly noted that the California, Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina
state constitutions prohibited judicial officers serving in minor courts to be paid from
the collection of fines and mandated judicial salaries from the state, regardless of
whether defendants were convicted or acquitted.451 However, Taft returned to the
question of the application of common law to the issue of impartiality, and this resulted
in the somewhat disjointed nature of the decision.452 He pointed to several state
440

See Bennett, 4 Tex. Ct. App. at 72-73.

441

Id. at 73.

442

See generally id.

443

See Wellmaker, 3 Ga. App. at 796.

444

See id. at 793.

445

See id. at 791.

446

See id. at 793.

447

See id.

448

See id.

449

Id. at 796-97.

450

Id. at 798.

451

See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 528 (1927).

452

See id.
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decisions in which citizens who happened to be taxpayers were deemed to be
incompetent to serve as jurors in a suit involving the municipality in which they
resided.453 On the other hand, he accepted that a taxpayer interest could be considered
remote to the point of not requiring disqualification. 454 To Taft, the issue of juror
competency served as an important analog to the status of inferior judges because
inferior judges served as a trier of fact. From this analysis, he concluded that Ohio’s
argument that the common law permitted inferior judges to collect fines as a salary
had no basis.455 Taft quickly dispatched the state’s final argument that Tumey had been
fined the minimum amount permissible under law after being adjudged guilty by the
overwhelming weight of the evidence. Taft responded to this argument by noting that
a party’s right to an impartial judge was more important.456 In other words, the amount
of the fine was not pertinent to right to an impartial judge.
C. Kinship: The Taft Family
The decision’s “kinship” statement is noteworthy beyond Van Devanter’s
recollection of Taft’s reasoning to Chief Justice Hughes. In 1925, the voters of
Hamilton County, Ohio elected Taft’s son, Charles Phelps Taft II, as their county
prosecutor.457 The younger Taft had promised the county’s electorate that he would
vigorously prosecute bootleggers and violent criminals, and Taft was intensely proud
of his son. 458 In August of that year, Taft wrote to Justice Sutherland, “My younger
boy, Charles P Taft, 2d has just been nominated for Prosecuting Attorney of Hamilton
County, where Cincinnati is. This is a very important position and one which offers
an opportunity that is quite unusual at his age of twenty-nine.”459 Taft described his
son’s campaign: “He was at the head of the citizens’ organization in the primary
against the regular organization. They had an election at which there were 60,000
votes, and it was hotly contested. Charlie won by 1,000 votes. [It was close so there
had to be a recount].”460
From the end of 1925 through the Court’s issuance of the decision, Taft maintained
an ongoing correspondence with his son about prohibition enforcement. Contained
within their letters is the fact that Judge Struble had sworn Charles into practice as a
prosecutor in late November 1925 and that Taft wrote a letter to Struble not only
thanking the judge for his kind words for his son, but also lauding Struble for his

453

Id. at 529 (citing Divieny v. City of Elmira, 51 N.Y. 506 (1873); Corwein v. Hames, 11
Johns 76 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1814); Fine v. St. Louis Pub. Sch., 30 Mo. 166 (1860); In re New
Boston, 49 N.H. 328 (1870)).
454

See Tumey, 273 U.S. at 531.

455

Id. at 535.

456

Id.

457 STEPHEN HESS, AMERICA’S POLITICAL DYNASTIES: FROM ADAMS
(Brookings Inst. ed. 2016).
458

TO

CLINTON 332-33

Id.

459

Letter from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to George
Sutherland, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Aug. 25, 1926) (on file in the Library of
Congress).
460

Id.
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decision in Tumey’s appeal.461 Taft’s letters to Struble cannot be found in either his
very large collection or that of his son, and Struble did not leave any historic repository
of his papers. But, on January 4, 1927, Charles wrote to his father:
I just have time to enclose a copy of remarks Judge Struble made at my
swearing in ceremony, although I did not expect him to say anything in
particular. I think he would appreciate a letter from you and I should like
to have you return this copy to me when you have read it.462
Taft, in turn responded to Charles two days later, “I am returning herewith the
stenographic copy of the remarks of Judge Struble at your induction in office. The
judge was very kindly in the language he used. I shall be glad to write him a letter and
say so.”463 On January 17, Charles informed his father that Struble “was tremendously
pleased and has been showing it to everybody.” 464
On March 12, 1927, Charles informed his father that the Supreme Court’s decision
was widely lauded throughout the state.465 Charles wrote, “You may have had the idea
before this that you were popular in your own state, but if you did not, you need now
revise your ideas.”466 Charles further praised his father, “I think that statues of you will
probably be erected in every city in Ohio. In fact, your glory is being reflected in the
name of Taft no matter who bears it, and I feel that if you were to run again now for
any office, it would secure a two-third majority.”467 In spite of this exchange, Tumey
should not be considered as evidence that Taft believed there were too many
prosecutions or that the problem of crime was overstated.
Both the Chief Justice and his son believed that there were significant increases in
crime not only in Hamilton County or Ohio, but also in the nation at large. In August
1927, Taft wrote to Charles that he was concerned with the “Cincinnati crime wave”
and understood that the failure to stop bootlegging, prostitution, and murder would
cripple confidence in the government.468 Taft noted to his son, “The immunity of these
bootleggers, due to the original conspiracy which prevents and terrorizes the natural
witnesses of the crime, is something I presume they have had in other parts of the
country.”469 He further mentioned:

461

Id.

462

Letter from Charles P. Taft, son of William Howard Taft, to William Howard Taft, Chief
Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Jan. 4, 1927) (on file in the Library of Congress).
463
Letter from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Charles P. Taft,
son of William Howard Taft (Jan 9, 1927) (on file in the Library of Congress).
464 Letter from Charles P. Taft, son of William Howard Taft, to William Howard Taft, Chief
Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Jan. 17, 1927) (on file in the Library of Congress).
465

See letter from Charles P. Taft, son of William Howard Taft, to William Howard Taft,
Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Mar. 12, 1927) (on file at the Library of Congress).
466

Id.

467

Id.

468

Letter from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Charles P. Taft,
son of William Howard Taft (Aug. 7, 1927) (on file in the Library of Congress).
469

Id.
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There is nothing to do but just keep at it, employ more detectives, if you
need them, and after a while you will begin to get the thread and then you
will have a collection of crimes with convictions that will break the thing
up, but it needs hard work and the closest investigation.”470
In July 1927, Taft complained to Charles that one of the problems with prohibition
enforcement was that Congress had underfunded the Treasury Department so that
there were too few agents to enforce the federal laws. 471 In a matter unrelated to
bootlegging or Ohio but contemporaneous with his discussion of Ohio’s law
enforcement problems, in this same letter to Charles, Taft criticized noted defense
counsel Clarence Darrow, as well as advocates to abolish the death penalty. 472
Although Charles believed that Tumey was so popular that it would pay political
dividends, it did not. He became well known for prosecuting George Remus, a
Cincinnati bootlegger who possessed political power in the state and had murdered his
own wife.473 However, a jury found Remus not guilty because of temporary insanity,
and this harmed Charles’ reputation.474 On July 25, 1928, Taft informed Sutherland:
[M]y son Charlie, the one who tried the Remus case, is running for office
again and has a primary on the 14th of August. He has a very decided
opposition, because the primary involves a charter or reform ticket and the
regular ticket. I have felt considerable doubt as to his success. 475

470 Letter from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Charles P. Taft,
son of William Howard Taft (Aug. 7, 1927) (on file in the Library of Congress).
471 Letter from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Charles P. Taft,
son of William Howard Taft (July 9, 1927) (on file in the Library of Congress).
472

Id. Taft’s letter read in part:
I don’t agree with the opponents of capital punishment at all. I think that
those who commit crimes of violence in robbery are directly affected by the
fear of capital punishment, and that it leaves the public helpless to abolish
that as the extreme penalty . . . This man Darrow, who came very near being
convicted of suborning perjury, is a great advocate of the abolition of the
death penalty. I can not understand what the vogue is which makes him so
popular a lecturer. One can understand why he is opposed to capital
punishment, because it is his business to oppose it. I think the escape of
those two young Jews who tortured that other young Jew to death is one of
the greatest miscarriages of justice that we have had, in that it did not result
in their execution.

Id. In this letter, Taft was referring to the Leopold and Loeb trial in Chicago.
473

COOK, supra note 284, at 130-38.

474

Id. at 167-69.

475 Letter from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to George
Sutherland, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (July 25, 1928) (on file in the Library of
Congress).
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Charles failed in his efforts to be reelected and left electoral politics for a decade.476
He would, however, be elected as Cincinnati’s mayor and be active in state politics. 477
On March 8, 1927, the Cincinnati Enquirer reported that the Ohio legislature
praised Taft and Cincinnati’s city government feted Struble as a local hero.478 Struble,
for his part, claimed the Court’s decision was a “rebirth of liberty.” 479 The same day,
the Chicago Tribune in a headline, which read “Village Mayor Loses Rum Fine Fee,”
reported that the Court’s “opinion is considered of unusual importance as it may be
interpreted to affect fee officers all over the country.” 480 The newspaper also noted that
Taft was from the same county in which the appeal arose.481 The Baltimore Sun noted,
under a headline titled “Fee Splitting held Illegal by Court,” that Maryland’s traffic
enforcement laws would have to change because the county magistrates who served
over traffic ordnance courts earned their salaries by convictions.482 Given the laudatory
reporting, one might have thought that Taft considered Tumey as the Court’s “final
say” on the matter of recusal and disqualification of judges. However, this was not the
case. Within a year, the Court accepted an appeal and issued a decision that provided
clarity to Tumey’s reach regarding challenges based on pecuniary interest. 483 Just as in
Tumey, the new appeal arose from a liquor court conviction in Ohio. 484 The Court in
Dugan v. Ohio determined that the mayor of the city of Xenia was not required to
recuse himself from the town’s liquor court proceedings because his salary was
generically based on the township’s ability to raise revenue through a variety of means,
including the collection of fines.485 The mayor’s salary originated from a general fund
based on monies accumulated through general fines, but the salary remained the same
whether a defendant was acquitted or convicted.486 In a brief unanimous decision, the
Court held that where a judicial officer is paid a regular salary through a general fund,
there is no direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of trials; therefore, the judge is
assumed to be impartial.487

476 Joseph Treaster, Charles P. Taft, Former Mayor of Cincinnati, N.Y. TIMES (June 25,
1983),
http://www.nytimes.com/1983/06/25/obituaries/charles-p-taft-former-mayor-ofcincinnati.html.
477

Id.

478

Highest Court Sounds Doom of Liquor Courts in Ohio, supra note 6, at 10.

479

Id.

480

Village Mayor Loses Rum Fine Fee, is Decision, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 8, 1927.

481

Id.

482

Fine Splitting Held Illegal by Court, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 8, 1927 at 5.

483

Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61 (1928).

484

Id.

485

Id.

486

Id. at 64.

487

Id. at 64-65.
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V. CONCLUSION: CONTEMPORARY USE OF THE DECISION AND AN ARGUMENT FOR
INCORPORATING JUDICIAL INTENT IN THE FUTURE
In a 2007 law review article referencing Tumey, a federal judge observed, “One
wonders how coincidental it was, but in 1927—just three years after the ABA adopted
its Canons—Chief Justice Taft authored a seminal opinion for the United States
Supreme Court.”488 The answer to this “wonder” is that there is no coincidence
between the establishment of the 1924 Canons of Ethics and Tumey. From the time
Taft became Chief Justice until his death on March 8, 1930, Taft shaped a
jurisprudence emphasizing the importance of an impartial judiciary in all of the
nation’s courts.
There remains a question noted in the introduction: Can the legal history of Tumey,
beginning with Chief Justice Taft’s intent, apply to appeals beyond pecuniary interest
considerations without undermining the integrity of the decision? Although the answer
is yes, perspective on this question may be found in the Burger Court’s deliberations
on a 1972 pecuniary interest case.489 Notwithstanding Dugan, there were a number of
unanswered questions regarding the full meaning of pecuniary interest, but it was not
until over four decades passed that the Court would attempt to provide clarity to this
meaning.490 In Ward v. Village of Monroeville,491 a majority of the Court interpreted
Tumey as extending to salaries of judicial officers that relied on an indirect system of
fine collections. That is, the city government of Monroeville, Ohio relied on the
collection of traffic fines to fund roughly half of its operating budget. 492 In an almost
analogous replay forty-five years after Tumey, the Court determined that Ohio’s
system of traffic enforcement violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.493 In an opinion authored by Justice William Brennan, the majority determined
that because mayors were permitted to serve as inferior judges and the revenue raised
from traffic enforcement that paid into a municipality’s funds, in turn, paid a mayor’s
salary, the trial process could not withstand constitutional scrutiny. 494 The majority did
not cite to Tumey as a dispositive decision, but the justices acknowledged that the Ohio

488

Judge Peter W. Bowie, The Last 100 Years: An Era of Expanding Appearances, 48 S.
TEX. L. REV. 911, 918 (2007).
489

Ward v. Vill. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972).

490

Id.

491

Id.

492

Id. at 57. The Court noted:

Thus, in 1964 this income contributed $23,589.50 of total village revenues of
$46,355.38; in 1965 it was $18,508.95 of $46,752.60; in 1966 it was $16,085 of
$43,585.13; in 1967 it was $20,060.65 of $53,931.43; and in 1968 it was $23,439.42 of
$52,995.95. This revenue was of such importance to the village that when legislation
threatened its loss, the village retained a management consultant for advice upon the
problem.
Id.
493

Id. at 60.

494

Id.
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Supreme Court did so.495 The difference between Tumey and Ward was that in Ward
the mayor’s fixed salary was directly dependent on the municipality’s maintenance of
revenue from traffic ordnance violations, but unlike in Tumey, the mayor’s salary
could not fluctuate based on the numbers of convictions. 496 The majority noted not
only that Ohio’s municipalities were generally dependent on traffic fines for the bulk
of revenue, but also that it was a common practice for the municipal police to charge
suspected offenders under their ordnances rather than under state law because once
charged under state law, all revenue raised from fines went to the state’s revenue
coffers.497 The Ohio traffic statute enabled a defendant to challenge judicial officers
for partiality on a case-by-case basis, but this statutory construct placed a burden of
proof on individual defendants rather than providing a universal safeguard. 498 Unlike
in Tumey, neither party requested an oral argument to the Court although the Court
ordered argument on October 17, 1972, in part, because the initial briefs were
lamentably bereft of constitutional analysis. 499 Ward is a brief five-page decision for
the majority, and the dissent, authored by Justice Byron White and joined by Justice
William Rehnquist, consists of two paragraphs.500 White insisted that Tumey was “not
controlling,” because the mayor in Ward had “no direct financial stake in its
outcome.”501
The brevity of the decision is not indicative of the Court’s deliberations on the
appeal or its use of Tumey. For instance, Justice Potter Stewart, an Ohioan, informed
Brennan that the decision, like Tumey, would have considerable impact throughout the
state.502 Moreover, Stewart argued that the decision should have enabled mayors to
accept guilty pleas in instances where a fine was “fixed and mandatory.”503 Originally,
Chief Justice Warren Burger assigned the opinion to Brennan as a per curiam decision,

495 Id. at 59. Three Ohio justices dissented. Blackmun penned into his personal notes, “[T]he
very fact that the Ohio Supreme Court split 4 to 3 is indicative to me of the closeness of the
issues even among state judges.”
496

See id. at 60; Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 512 (1927).

497

Ward, 409 U.S. at 59-60.

498

Id. at 61.

499

See, e.g., Rehnquist, J., Draft Dissent, Ward v. Vill. Monroevill, 409 U.S. 57, (Jan. 19,
1972) (on file with the Papers of Justice Harry A. Blackmun in the Library of Congress).
500

Ward, 409 U.S. at 62 (White, J., dissenting).

501

Id. at 62.

502

Letter from Potter Stewart, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to William J.
Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, (Oct. 27, 1972) (on file in the Library of
Congress). Justice Stewart’s letter to Justice Brennan resulted in Chief Justice Burger asking
Justice Brennan to alter the decision to enable mayors to act in a clerical capacity such as the
acceptance of a guilty plea. Letter from Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court,
to William J. Brennan, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, (Nov. 2, 1972) (on file in the
Library of Congress).
503 Letter from Potter Stewart, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to William J.
Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, (Oct. 27, 1972) (on file in the Library of
Congress).
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but because of the two dissenting justices, the decision listed the individual justices.504
Justice Blackmun’s notes indicate that the majority debated the applicability of Tumey
to Ward’s appeal.505 Blackmun interpreted Tumey as standing for two propositions.
First, that because Mayor A.R. Pugh directly and personally benefitted from finding
Edward Tumey guilty, he was an interested party in the trial. 506 Second, Pugh had a
“personal interest in the fiscal soundness” of North College Hill, and “fines
substantially contributed to that soundness.” 507 Blackmun acknowledged that Taft had
led the Court in Tumey to the proposition that not all instances in which a mayor’s
executive function and judicial functions were intertwined resulted in a due process
violation.508 This is why, Blackmun believed, that Taft had clarified Tumey with
Dugan. However, because of “the sizeable dependency of the village upon its traffic
fines and the mayor’s responsibility for the village’s good fiscal condition,” Blackmun
concluded the second proposition had been violated, and, therefore, Tumey should be
extended to an area beyond a narrow definition of “direct pecuniary interest.” 509
Initially Justice Rehnquist intended to separately concur.510 On October 30, he
circulated a draft concurrence in which he conceded to the majority that the process
of challenging the partiality of mayors and seeking recusals was flawed, but then, he
insisted that traffic courts were not entitled to the same due process standards as
criminal trials.511 However, on January 19, 1972, he dissented by arguing that the
majority not only wrongly expanded Tumey, but he also claimed the majority
“undermined tens of thousands of courts similar to that of Monroeville throughout the
country.”512 He also complained that he could not “subscribe to the Court’s action in
summarily reversing the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio without the further
504 See, e.g., per curiam draft (Jan. 10, 1972); Letter from William O. Douglas, Assoc.
Justice, U.S. Supreme Court to William J. Brennan, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Dec.
28, 1971) (on file with the Papers of Harry A. Blackmun in the Library of Congress); Letter
from Potter Stewart, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court to William J. Brennan, Assoc. Justice,
U.S. Supreme Court (Jan. 3, 1972) (on file in the Library of Congress). On the original definition
of “per curiam,” meaning “an uncontroversial decision by an appellate court, see Per Curiam,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1201 (9th ed. 2009). For a criticism of the overuse of per curiam
decisions, see Ira P. Robbins, Hiding Behind the Cloak of Invisibility: The Supreme Court and
Per Curiam Opinions, 86 TUL. L. REV, 1202-10 (2102).
505

Papers of Justice Harry A. Blackmun (on file in the Library of Congress).

506

Id.

507

Id.

508

Id.

509

Papers of Harry A. Blackmun (June 27, 1972) (on file in the Library of Congress).

510

Rehnquist, J., Draft Concurrence, Ward v. Vill. Monroevill, 409 U.S. 57 (Oct. 30, 1972)
(on file in the Papers of Justice Harry A. Blackmun in the Library of Congress).
511 Id. Rehnquist’s position on the limited application of due process to lesser courts was
evident in Argerinsger v.Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), in which he joined with Powell in a
concurrence arguing that the right to counsel as determined in Gideon v. Wainright did not
extend to all petty trials.
512 Rehnquist, J., Draft Dissent, Ward v. Vill. Monroevill, 409 U.S. 57 (Jan. 19, 1972) (on
file with the Papers of Justice William J. Brennan in the Library of Congress) [hereinafter
Rehnquist, Draft Dissent].
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enlightenment that might come from oral argument and briefing.” 513 On November 1,
1972, Rehnquist opted to withdraw his dissent and joined with White. 514 But, there is
a feature of Rehnquist’s January 19 draft that was later parroted by Justice Scalia in
Caperton v. A.V. Massey. Among Rehnquist’s stated reasons for dissent was a fear
that the majority’s decision would lead to an increase in challenges against judges and
subsequent litigation.515 In spite of Rehnquist and White’s opposition to the ultimate
decision, the majority had crafted a decision that was consistent with Taft’s views of
the judiciary. That is, the Court in Ward found that the means of collecting revenues
for the payment of judicial salaries undermined public confidence in the courts. 516
Likewise, roughly two decades after Ward, a new majority followed the basic
tenets of Taft’s jurisprudence in its 2009 Caperton decision.517 In this decision, an
appellant had donated not only to a candidate’s campaign to unseat a sitting state court
justice, but also had also sent $2.5 million to a political action group that campaigned
for the judicial challenger, Brent Benjamin. 518 Justice Benjamin succeeded in his
campaign to unseat a sitting state justice.519 While there is no evidence Justice
Benjamin financially benefitted from the decision in the case, the Court’s majority
concluded that the donation required a judicial disqualification because of the
appearance of a connection between Justice Benjamin and the appellant.520 In
particular, the donation to the election occurred after an adverse trial court decision
and during the pendency of the appeal.521 The fact that the winning party in the case
had a $50 million verdict overturned in the favor of the party that donated to Justice
Benjamin gave an appearance that one of the justices on the state court had been
513

Id.

514

Letter from William Howard Rehnquist, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Byron R.
White, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Nov. 1, 1972) (on file in the Library of Congress);
Letter from William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Warren E. Burger,
Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Nov. 1, 1954) (on file in the Library of Congress).
515 Rehnquist, Draft Dissent, supra note 512. Rehnquist’s phrase, “Thus the Court
admonishes us that traffic judges, like Caesar’s wife, must be above suspicion; however
commendable this may be as a moral principle, both its generality and vagueness as a
constitutional command cannot help but spawn litigation. Id. For comparison, see Caperton v.
AT Massey Coal Co Inc., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (Scalia J., dissenting). Justice Scalia claimed:

The Court’s opinion will reinforce that perception, adding to the vast arsenal of lawyerly
gambits what will come to be known as the Caperton claim. The facts relevant to
adjudicating it will have to be litigated—and likewise the law governing it, which will
be indeterminate for years to come, if not forever. Many billable hours will be spent in
poring through volumes of campaign finance reports, and many more in contesting nonrecusal decisions through every available means.
Id.
516

Ward v. Vill. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972).

517

Caperton, 556 U.S. 868.

518

Id. at 873.

519

Id. at 885.

520

Id. at 887-88.

521

Id. at 873.
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“bought.”522 Then, the majority concluded that the appearance of a “bought vote”
undermined the public’s belief in a fair tribunal.523 Given Taft’s efforts to reform the
judiciary as an underlying feature of Tumey, the majority’s use of the decision in
appeals arising from financial transactions comport with Taft’s intent underlying the
decision.
A second, and concededly more theoretical arena, involves Tumey’s application to
restrictions on judicial behavior. Led by Scalia, the majority’s placement of the First
Amendment over judicial efficacy in Minnesota v. White provides an example of a
departure from Taft’s intent. 524 Coupling Taft’s concurrence in Hecht, in which he
acknowledged only a limited right of criticism against judges, with Tumey, it is
probable that Taft would not have opposed a limited speech restriction on judicial
campaigns. Moreover, while it is true that Taft never embraced the Brandeis/Holmes
jurisprudence on free speech, he believed that public confidence in the judiciary was
a key goal for the nation’s courts. It is clear that in analyzing Cooke alongside of
Tumey, he insisted on significant restraints on judicial temptations, or at least the
appearance of such. While Taft would have considered general criticism of the
judiciary to be fair play, he also, based on his experience with Landis, might have
found it permissible to limit judicial speech. This may be one reason why he placed
the following line in the decision:
[E]very procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average
man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the
defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and
true between the State and the accused, denies the latter due process of
law.525
In the recent Williams v. Pennsylvania526 decision, the majority held that a sitting state
supreme court justice who, while serving as a prosecuting attorney, supervised
prosecutors in a death penalty case almost thirty years earlier, had a duty to recuse
himself from an appeal arising out of the conviction in that case. The majority, led by
Justice Kennedy, determined that because the state supreme court justice took a
significant part in one aspect of the death penalty trial, there was not only an
unacceptable risk of actual bias, but also a risk that “endangered the appearance of
neutrality.”527 Although the majority only cited Tumey once, the decision nonetheless
embraced Taft’s intent underlying the application of Tumey to a broader use regarding
disqualification.528
The courts should extend a greater use of Tumey as it applies to the nexus between
disqualification and recusal on the one side and maintaining a public, rather than a
theoretical, conception of judicial integrity on the other. This argument, like Taft’s
522 See, e.g., Jeffrey Stempel, Impeach Brent Benjamin Now? Giving Adequate Attentions to
Judicial Impartiality, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV 1, 17 (2010).
523

Id. at 61.

524

Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 782 (2002).

525

Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).

526

Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016).

527

Id. at 1908.

528

Id. at 1909.
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jurisprudence, is not based on any appeal for judicial activism or the extension of a
so-called “progressive jurisprudence.” Rather, it is in the application of Taft’s
conservative intent underlying Tumey to the present issues of indirect pecuniary
interest, the interest of a donor, and the issues of campaign speech, which “opens the
door” to the decision’s extended application in disqualification and recusal appeals.
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